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ABSTRACT 
 Subsidies, taxes, premiums, and eligibility for health insurance can potentially cause 
“marriage lock,” in which couples stay married for the sake of health insurance coverage, 
and marriage lock may change under the Affordable Care Act. In the first two chapters, 
marriage lock is examined in the context of two key health insurance decisions: divorce 
decisions upon qualification for Medicare at age 65, and marriage and divorce decisions 
associated with the introduction of the Massachusetts insurance mandate and health 
insurance exchange market reforms in 2006. In the first chapter, using Health and 
Retirement Study data, I find evidence of a 7 percentage point increase in the number of 
divorces upon achieving Medicare eligibility at age 65 for people with spousal insurance 
coverage relative to those without it. In the second chapter, using American Community 
Survey data, I find that the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform increased incentives 
for marriage in the health insurance exchange market relative to control states. 
Specifically, the Massachusetts reform appears to have reduced the divorce rate by 0.5 
percentage point and increased marriage rate by 1.4 percentage points. 
 In the third chapter, I use data from the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) to 
explore three decisions potentially affected by the implementation of Medical Savings 
Accounts (MSAs). First, I find that individuals with MSAs incur 17 RMB more medical 
vii 
 
 expenses per 1000 RMB increase in their MSA balance, while I find no significant effect 
of after-tax income on medical expenses. Second, I study preference heterogeneity as 
revealed by three types of risky behaviors. I find that undertaking risky investments is 
associated with 23% greater medical expenditures, while always using a seatbelt and 
obeying traffic signals are associated with 16% and 22% higher medical expenditures, 
respectively. Finally, I find evidence suggesting that individuals become more risk 
adverse with MSAs than without, specifically by increasing their use of seatbelts and 
obeying traffic signals. These findings, using recent Chinese data, suggest that MSAs 
play an important role when consumers make health expenditure decisions, and that 
preferences involving risk and prevention also appear to be influenced by the MSA 
scheme. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 The predominant source of health insurance in the United States is employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESI). Nearly two-thirds of adults under age 65 and three-
quarters of all full-time workers obtain health insurance through their employers (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2007). A potential cost of this reliance on ESI is the non-portability of 
insurance across employers, which is likely to result in “job lock,” a phenomenon 
whereby people remain in jobs that they might otherwise leave. 
A similar concern regarding disruptions to health insurance coverage may also 
influence the decisions of individuals contemplating divorce. People currently covered by 
their spouse’s ESI lose such coverage on divorce. Potential divorcees may face high 
premiums in the individual health insurance market or the possibly prohibitive health 
costs of being uninsured. Furthermore, changes in health plans and providers may be 
disruptive and costly. Unless they have alternative sources of health insurance coverage, 
such as ESI through their own employer or Medicare or Medicaid, this health insurance 
conundrum could result in “marriage lock,” which functions in a similar manner to job 
lock, causing people to remain married despite wanting a divorce. 
Individuals dependent on a spouse's ESI prior to divorce are among the most 
vulnerable to insurance loss after divorce. Such potential divorcees must search for 
alternative insurance sources to prevent gaps in coverage and may need to rely on the 
individual non-group health insurance market. The shortcomings of this market are well 
documented and can create significant barriers to coverage for divorcees without their 
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own sources of health insurance. Compared to ESI plans in which employers contribute 
almost 80 % of a single premium, non-group health insurance policies are typically more 
expensive for comparable benefits because the enrollee typically pays the full premium, 
administrative costs are higher, and coverage is typically less generous. In 2009, the 
average annual premium for non-elderly single policies was $2985. The average 
premiums are even higher for older people ($5755 for single policies for people aged 60–
64). To obtain an affordable policy, non-group purchasers often forego critical benefits 
such as pharmaceuticals and mental health services. In addition, in most states, 
individuals attempting to purchase insurance can be denied coverage due to their health 
status, age, or other risk factors. If sold a policy, they may be charged more because of 
these factors, and particular types of care may be excluded from coverage. 
A patchwork of federal and state laws attempts to help dependent spouses retain 
health insurance coverage after divorce. For example, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, known as COBRA, is a federal law that allows divorcees to continue 
to use an ex-spouse’s coverage for up to 36 months. However, the protections offered 
within this patchwork have significant limitations. COBRA coverage is expensive, 
because enrollees must pay the full cost of the premium (with no premium subsidies) plus 
a 2% administrative fee. Thus, COBRA coverage may be out of reach financially for 
many divorcees. 
The underlying theoretical model most commonly used to analyze marriage 
behavior is based loosely on the Becker model of marriage (Becker, 1981). The Becker 
model suggests that divorce occurs when the expected utility from being married is less 
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than the expected utility from being single. For people who depend on their spouse’s 
health insurance, leaving a marriage implies leaving the guarantee of subsidized health 
insurance coverage. The spouse’s ESI could be considered part of the value of the 
marriage because of the uncertainty of the non-group health insurance marketplace. Many 
people may decide to stay in their current marriage despite incentives for divorce because 
they are afraid they may be denied health insurance coverage due to pre-existing 
conditions or lose access to trusted providers or may be unable to afford healthcare 
premiums. 
In the US, most individuals become eligible for public health insurance (Medicare) 
at age 65. Attaining Medicare eligibility immediately reduces the value an individual 
places on a spouse’s health insurance coverage and therefore on their marriage. 
According to the Becker model, when an individual who depends on their spouse’s health 
insurance coverage qualifies for Medicare at age 65, reductions in the value of marriage 
increase the probability of divorce. Becker’s model predicts that individuals whose only 
source of health insurance coverage is through a spouse's insurance plan are more likely 
to get divorced when they first qualify for Medicare than those who have other sources of 
health insurance coverage, suggesting that health insurance coverage can indeed serve as 
a marriage lock. Remarkably, very few studies have empirically examined this issue, 
which serves as the focus of this first chapter.  
In this chapter, I examine whether health insurance coverage affects late-life divorce 
by exploiting the abrupt change in health insurance coverage that occurs at age 65 due to 
Medicare. Focusing on individuals aged 60 to 70, the discontinuity in coverage suggests 
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that a difference-in-difference (DID) comparison between the flow of new divorces for 
individuals dependent on spousal health insurance coverage who are younger than 65 and 
the divorce flow for those who are age 65 and older provides a test of the marriage lock 
hypothesis. In this analysis I focus on the “divorce flow” or newly divorced rate which is 
the rate of new divorces among those currently married, to distinguish it from the divorce 
level, which is confusingly often called the divorce rate but is the fraction of the total 
population that is currently unmarried due to divorce (a stock concept). (Consider the 
analogous savings and savings rate.) I empirically define the flow of divorce in my 
regressions as a dummy variable equal to one if an individual gets newly divorced 
between the interview waves. Although previous studies have exploited the discontinuity 
in health insurance coverage created by Medicare (e.g., Card et al., 2008, 2009) to study 
retirement and insurance decisions, to my knowledge, this is the first study that uses the 
discontinuity created by Medicare to test the marriage lock hypothesis. 
To give a quick preview, my estimation results support the hypothesis that 
individuals who lack an alternative source of health insurance coverage are more likely to 
get divorced when they become eligible for Medicare than those who have other sources 
of health insurance coverage. My parameter estimates imply that qualification for 
Medicare at age 65 increases the probability of divorce by approximately 7% for 
individuals dependent on spousal insurance coverage compared with for those who have 
other sources of coverage. In addition, I use several triple-difference models to estimate 
the interaction among spousal employer-based insurance coverage dependence, lack of 
alternative access to public health insurance (e.g., Medicaid or Medicare obtained before 
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age 65), and age of Medicare eligibility. I find that individuals who have a single access 
point, i.e., a spousal employer-provided health insurance plan, are approximately 6% 
more likely to leave their marriage after age 65 than individuals who have access to an 
alternative source of health insurance prior to age 65. These results are not sensitive to 
dependent variables, and I do not find evidence from additional specification estimates 
that other factors such as retirement, social security, and full retirement are responsible 
for the increase in divorce flows after an individual turns 65. 
Literature Review 
 The existing economics literature on health insurance and family structures has 
primarily focused on estimating how the revolution in marriage and divorce law the 
United States has affected the marriage behavior and labor supply of couples, as well as 
the impact of health insurance coverage on labor force participation and self-
employment. A large body of work in family economics analyzes how various public 
policies may affect people’s marriage behavior and family structure (e.g., the unilateral 
divorce law and the same-sex marriage law). Peters (1986) shows that unilateral divorce 
has basically no effect on the probability of divorce as suggested by the Coase theorem. 
Allen (1992) argues that transaction cost is significant in marital bargaining, and he 
shows that the divorce rate increased significantly once no-fault divorce laws were 
introduced. Rasul (2006) and Mechoulan (2006) suggest that the divorce rate rose sharply 
following the adoption of unilateral laws; however, the increase was reversed within 
approximately a decade, possibly because of better marital sorting. Gruber (2004) 
confirms that unilateral divorce regulations significantly increased the incidence of 
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divorce by using 40 years of census data to exploit the variation in divorce regulation 
changes across states and over time. He find that adults who were exposed to unilateral 
divorce regulations as children were less well educated, had lower family incomes, 
married earlier, and separated more often. Buchmueller and Carpenter (2010) use the 
California Health Interview Survey to study the response of same-sex couples to the 
option of receiving health insurance through a spouse's employer and find that lesbians 
are more likely to have insurance through a spouse's employer and less likely to work 
full-time. 
In contrast with the dearth of research on how insurance affects divorce rates, a large 
literature examines the extent to which health insurance influences individuals’ decisions 
concerning labor force participation and self-employment. The predominant source of 
health insurance in the United States is ESI. Historically, health benefits were offered in 
tight labor markets as a method of attracting employees (Fronstin, 2006). Employees who 
prefer health insurance coverage may be willing to forgo other benefits, job attributes, or 
wages in order to obtain employer-provided coverage (Rosen, 1986). Many economists 
and health policy experts believe that tying health insurance coverage to job status causes 
people to stay in jobs that they might otherwise leave, a phenomenon known as job lock.  
A large body of literature examines the job lock effect of ESI on employer-to-
employer mobility. The classic study by Madrian (1994) estimates that job lock reduces 
the voluntary turnover rate of those with ESI by 25%, a rate that has been revised 
downward by subsequent studies. Rust and Phelan (1997) investigate how the U.S. Social 
Security and Medicare insurance systems affect the labor supply in the presence of 
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incomplete markets for loans, annuities, and health insurance. They find significant 
"security value" for individuals to remain employed until they are eligible for Medicare 
coverage at age 65. Rogowski and Karoly (2000) study the role of health insurance in the 
retirement decisions of older workers. They use data from the 1992 and 1996 Health and 
Retirement Survey to demonstrate that access to post-retirement health insurance has a 
large effect on retirement. They find that older male workers with retiree health benefit 
offers are more likely to retire than their counterparts who lose employment-based health 
insurance upon retirement. Gruber and Madrian (2004) conduct a literature review and 
document the distortions to the labor market associated with such a system, including 
limited job-to-job mobility and distorted retirement decisions. They conclude that health 
insurance has important effects on both labor force participation and job choice, but that 
it is not clear whether these effects result in large losses of either welfare or efficiency. 
Besides the literature on “job lock,” some recent papers have empirically analyzed 
the effects of health insurance coverage on entrepreneurship and self-employment. 
Fairlie, Kapur, and Gates (2011) use data from the 1996 to 2006 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) to find large, statistically significant results indicating that men and women 
are less likely to start businesses if they do not have a spouse with employer-based 
insurance and if there is a family member in bad health. They also focus on the increase 
in the probability of self-employment when an individual becomes eligible for Medicare 
and is no longer dependent on employment for access to guaranteed comprehensive 
insurance coverage. They find that the increase in the probability of owning a business 
once an individual reaches age 65 is 13%. A study by the Urban Institute (2013) 
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estimates that an additional 1.5 million people will launch their own business and become 
self-employed because of key provisions in the ACA that make high-quality insurance on 
the open market more accessible and affordable. Significant barriers to coverage are 
eliminated and more people are able to start their own business without risking denial of 
coverage or not being able to afford the premiums. 
Similar effects of health insurance coverage may also apply to welfare recipients or 
the disabled population; tying health insurance coverage to benefits may exacerbate the 
strong incentives to never leave welfare/disability. Evidence suggests that “welfare lock” 
is statistically significant but relatively small in magnitude (Ellwood and Adams, 1990; 
Yelowitz, 1995; Livermore, Roche, and Prenovitz, 2009). In addition, access to spousal 
health insurance has been noted in several studies on health insurance and job mobility or 
business creation (Madrian, 1994; Holtz-Eakin , Penrod, and Rosen, 1996; Kapur, 1998; 
Madrian and Lefgren, 1998; Wellington, 2001). 
From the literature, it is clear that health insurance has an important influence on 
many decisions, including those concerning retirement, job-to-job mobility, 
entrepreneurship, and self-employment. However, no studies have identified the effects 
of health insurance coverage on late-life divorce or marriage behavior. To my knowledge, 
this is the first study that bridges health insurance coverage and marriage behavior by 
using the discontinuity in health insurance coverage created by Medicare and health 
insurance exchanges to test the marriage lock hypothesis. 
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Model 
 I develop a model of the decision to get divorced in order to understand how health 
insurance coverage affects marriage behavior, especially for potential divorcees who are 
approaching age 65 and will qualify for Medicare. Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977) 
and Becker (1981) suggest that divorce occurs when the expected utility from being 
married is less than that from being single. This situation exists because marriage as a 
transaction may be costly to enter and leave in terms of time, money, and effort. 
Based on Becker’s model on decision-making in marriage, first consider a general 
model with identical men and women that seek each other in the marriage market, with 
strictly quasi-linear preferences, as follows: 
𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 + �𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗 − 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗�,     𝑗𝑗 = 𝑀𝑀, 𝑆𝑆                                                                                             (1.1) 
where M denotes married and S denotes single/divorced. V is the utility gain measured in 
dollar units from a set of variables that could affect a marriage and divorce decision (e.g. 
children, income, retirement and love); H is the utility gain measured in dollar units from 
having health insurance coverage; 𝜋𝜋 is the premium/cost of health insurance; and (H − 
π) is the net value from having health insurance coverage. 
For simplicity, I assume there is no variation in insurance quality, i.e., H is assumed 
to be the same for all insurance plans. The premiums available to divorcees at different 
ages vary. In addition, I assume individuals only have ESI in marriage and do not change 
their health insurance choices if they stay married. Divorcees choose health insurance 
plans on the individual non-group market before age 65 and on the Medicare market 
thereafter. That is, 
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𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 = 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀, 
𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 = 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸, 
𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆 = �𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 65𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 , 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ≥ 65  and 
𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 < 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 < 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
Figure 1 illustrates health insurance premiums for potential divorcees by age. The 
figure shows that premiums in the individual non-group market are at high levels and that 
they keep increasing from age 60 to age 65. Then, after individuals reach age 65, 
premiums decrease sharply to a very low and constant level because of Medicare. 
To decide whether to leave or enter into a marriage, individuals choose between M 
and S so as to maximize the following: 
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 [𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀 − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆, 0] 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀 − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0, he she⁄ stays married; 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀 − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 < 0, he/she divorces. 
Next, I have 
𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀 − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 = 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 + (𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀 − 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀) − 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 − (𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 − 𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆) = 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 − 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 + (𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆 − 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀) 
= �𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 − 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 +  �𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸�, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 < 65
𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 − 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 + (𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 − 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸), 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ≥ 65                                                              (1.2) 
In conclusion, before age 65, individuals stay married as long as  
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ≥ 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 + (𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 − 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀). After age 65, divorce occurs as long as  
𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 < 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 + (𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 − 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀). 
If 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 − 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 = 0, that is, the basic utility of being single equals the basic utility of 
staying married despite health insurance coverage, the individual is indifferent between 
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divorce and marriage. Because 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 < 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 < 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , potential divorcees 
choose to stay married before reaching 65 and divorce thereafter. 
Figure 2 shows the decision-making process in Equation 1.2 by illustrating the net 
utility gain from marriage for potential divorcees as a function of age. Because premiums 
in the individual non-group market keep increasing from age 60 to age 65, the net utility 
gains from marriage keep increasing. However, premiums decrease sharply to the 
subsidized, constant Medicare premium level after age 65, and the utility gain from 
marriage also drops sharply. If the net utility gain is still larger than or equal to zero, the 
model predicts that the individual will choose  to stay married; if the net utility gain 
from marriage is smaller than zero, the divorce incentives increase, possibly causing the 
individual to choose to divorce. 
Finally, I add some randomness to the identical individual model by introducing a 
random error term  𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 to equation 1.1. Now I have 
∆𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = ∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,                                                                                                         (1.3) 
where ∆𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,   ∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,  ∆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 , 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖. 
Thus, individuals choose to divorce if  𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 < −∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 − ∆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖. Note that ∆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 is 
assumed to be identical for everyone and ∆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 depends only on age.  
I make two different assumptions about the distribution of  𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖. On one hand, if 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 
is independent and identically distributed, the probability of getting divorced each period 
goes up when ∆𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 becomes less positive. Thus, this model implies a shift in the divorce 
curve after individuals becoming eligible for Medicare. On the other hand, if 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is a 
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permanent individual effect, there is a spike in the divorce rate at the time of Medicare 
eligibility. 
The real world situation could reflect a combination of the transitory and permanent 
errors. That is, the abrupt change in health insurance coverage that happens at age 65 due 
to Medicare will increase the divorce flow at age 65, as well as shift the divorce pattern 
after age 65. I expect to see a spike in the divorce flow at age 65, and a shift in the level 
of divorce flow rates for all ages after age 66. 
Data 
 For this chapter on the Medicare market, I use Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
data to investigate whether eligibility for Medicare increases late-life divorce flows. The 
HRS is a longitudinal panel study that surveys a representative sample of more than 
26,000 Americans over the age of 50 every two years, collecting information regarding 
every respondent’s income, work, retirement, marriage status, assets, social security 
incomes, pension plans, health insurance, disability, health status, and healthcare 
expenditures. The HRS questions ask individuals whether they divorced between the 
recent interview waves (which are every two years); thus, I use a probability distribution 
for the age of divorce for each respondent who reported that they divorced between the 
most recent interview waves. Furthermore, I use simulations to check for robustness. 
Method 
Because there might be an effect at the group level (i.e., age clustering in the first 
section and state clustering in the second section), I explore two approaches to control for 
potential clustering of errors. I first follow the one step method to estimate the Eicker-
 
 
13 
 
White clustered standard errors at the group level. However, the standard asymptotic 
arguments for the consistency of clustered standard errors may not apply given the small 
number of groups in this study; I still run the risk of underestimating standard errors and 
over-rejecting the null hypothesis using the one-step approach. Therefore, I adopt the 
two-step estimator suggested by Donald and Lang (2007) and make the generous 
assumption that unobserved cluster effects are drawn from a homoskedastic normal 
distribution. 
For the first chapter on the Medicare market, I first use a DID model to examine 
whether health insurance coverage affects divorce rates for individuals with spousal 
health insurance coverage dependence by exploiting the discontinuity created at age 65 
when individuals qualify for Medicare. Then, I use the triple-difference approach to study 
how the variation at the age 65 cutoff has affected individuals who have a single source 
of spousal health insurance coverage versus individuals who have their own public health 
insurance coverage.  
I estimate a DID model to study the divorce behavior of individuals with spousal 
coverage dependence when considering that eligibility for Medicare starts at age 65. I 
construct the main experimental group of spousal coverage dependence, in which 
individuals either provide employer sponsored health insurance to their spouse or get 
coverage from the spouse’s employer sponsored insurance. I isolate the effects of the 
“Medicare notch” on late-life divorce by estimating the interaction term between the age 
eligibility for Medicare and the group dummy for individuals with spousal coverage 
dependence, addressing concerns about the potential influence of observables such as 
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age, retirement, and social security benefits on the results. The approach is useful for 
identifying whether marriage lock exists for individuals with spousal coverage 
dependence. Empirically, I estimate the following model: 
𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽5𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖  + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,                     (1.4) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  equals 1 if the individual got divorced between interview waves. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 
denotes whether an individual or his/her spouse is equal to or older than 65. 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 denotes 
whether an individual is in the treatment group of spousal coverage dependence, that is, 
whether the individual provides ESI coverage to or receives it from his/her spouse. The 
coefficient on the interaction between eligibility for the treatment group and qualification 
for Medicare at age 65, β4, captures the DID estimate for marriage lock. In addition, X is 
a vector of demographic and control variables, λt is the year dummy, and δs is the region 
effect. 
As noted above, the HRS interviews respondents every two years and asks them 
whether they divorced between recent interview waves. I cannot, however, identify the 
actual year or age of divorce for individuals who reported that they divorced between 
recent interview waves. There are three possibilities for the actual year of divorce; People 
could get divorced in the current interview year, the past year, or two years before the 
interview year (i.e. t, t−1, or t−2, respectively.) Therefore, I estimate this model by 
assigning a probability to the respondents’ divorce years based on the length of time 
between interview waves. That is, people divorce in the past full year (t−1) with 
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probability 0.5, in the current interview year (t) with probability 0.25, or in the two years 
before the interview year (t−2) with probability 0.25. 1 
In addition, to further investigate the Medicare notch effect on late-life divorce for 
individuals with spousal coverage dependence but with other sources of public health 
insurance coverage, I estimate a triple-difference model for individuals who have a single 
source of spousal health insurance coverage versus those having their own public health 
insurance coverage. Individuals who have only a single source of spousal employer-
provided health insurance are supposed to be more likely to leave marriage after age 65 
than individuals who have access to an alternative source of public health insurance (e.g., 
Medicaid or Medicare obtained before age 65). Empirically, I estimate the following DID 
model: Y𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5(𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽6(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖)+ 𝛽𝛽7(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽8𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖  + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                   (1.5) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  equals 1 if the individual gets divorced between the interview waves. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 
denotes whether the age of an individual or his/her spouse is equal to or older than 65. 
𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 denotes whether an individual is in the treatment group of spousal coverage 
dependence, that is, whether the individual provides ESI coverage to or obtains ESI 
coverage from his/her spouse. 𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 denotes whether an individual has other public health 
insurance, such as Medicaid or Medicare obtained before age 65. The coefficient on the 
interaction term among eligibility for the spousal coverage dependence group, the group 
1 These probabilities are consistent with the distribution from a small sample with the actual age of divorce 
reported in the HRS. 
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dummy for owning other public health insurance, and qualification for Medicare at age 
65, β7, captures the DID estimate of marriage lock. In addition, X is a vector of 
demographic and control variables, λt is the year dummy, and δs is the region effect. 
Results 
In the first chapter, I focus on the abrupt change in health insurance coverage 
occurring at age 65 because of Medicare. I explore whether the gain in health insurance at 
age 65 encourages individuals with spousal coverage dependence to divorce. I restrict the 
sample to individuals who are either married or divorced. To focus the analysis around 
age 65, when individuals qualify for Medicare, I further limit the sample to individuals 
aged 60 to 70. Because the number of observations becomes small and the coefficient 
estimates become erratic when the age of the older spouse exceeds 71, the age of the 
older spouse is set to be between 58 and 71. In the first chapter, using a difference-in-
difference estimation and triple-difference estimation, I find that individuals who depend 
on spousal health insurance coverage are more likely to get divorced upon achieving 
Medicare eligibility at age 65 than those without it. 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
I cannot obtain the direct effect of health insurance coverage on divorce from the 
whole population because the effect may be contaminated by unmeasured variables (e.g., 
marriage and job quality). Therefore, I only focus on individuals with spousal coverage 
dependence whose divorce decisions may be affected by health insurance coverage. After 
the age of 65, individuals automatically qualify for Medicare, which provides universal 
access to health insurance coverage. Because individuals with health insurance coverage 
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dependence no longer have to be concerned about losing spousal health insurance 
coverage after age 65, the value they place on spousal health insurance coverage or 
current marriage is reduced. According to the model, the probability of divorce should 
increase after age 65 for these individuals. 
Table 1 reports the DID estimates from Eq. 1.4 considering whether either spouse 
is age 65 or older. I report both the one-step OLS estimates and the two-step estimates. 
The coefficient on the interaction term between the age 65 cutoff dummy variable and the 
spousal coverage dependence group dummy is positive and statistically significant under 
both the one-step OLS and the two-step estimation, suggesting that individuals with 
spousal coverage dependence are approximately 7% more likely than individuals without 
such dependence to get divorced when either of the spouses qualifies for Medicare at age 
65. In other words, individuals with spousal coverage dependence are more likely to be 
deterred from divorce before age 65 because of their current health insurance status. The 
positive and significant coefficient is consistent with the notion that a spouse’s employer-
provided health insurance coverage is a disincentive to divorce before age 65. Generally, 
the signs, magnitudes, and significance levels of the coefficients are stable across 
specifications. The divorce rates decrease with the number of children, years married, 
times married, age, and family income, whereas personal income, education level, 
disability, and retirement increase the divorce rate. 
I also investigate whether the effect of Medicare eligibility on late-life divorce is a 
one-time effect at age 65 or a permanent effect that persists after age 65. To do so, I 
create two age cutoff dummy variables for Medicare eligibility, that is, one for which 
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either spouse’s age is equal to 65 (age = 65) and the other for which either spouse is older 
than 66 (age ≥ 66). Table 2 reports the DID estimates from Eq. 1.4 using these two age 
cutoff dummies. The coefficient on the dummy for (age = 65) suggests that individuals 
are approximately 8% more likely to get divorced at age 65, when they qualify for 
Medicare, and the coefficients on the (age ≥ 66) dummy suggest they are approximately 
6% more likely to get divorced after age 65. The coefficients for the interaction term 
between the (age= 65) dummy and the spousal coverage dependence group dummy are 
significant in both the one-step OLS estimation and two-step estimation, while the 
interaction term involving the (age ≥ 66) dummy is not significant in the two-step 
estimation.  
Figure 3 depicts the age variation in divorce flow between the ESI coverage 
dependence group and the “no such dependence” group by plotting the difference of the 
first-step coefficients between the groups.2 Figure 3 shows a spike at age 65, which 
suggests that many individuals with spousal coverage dependence experience a divorce at 
age 65. In addition to their aversion of the high premiums and cost sharing on the non-
group market, potential divorcees choose to stay in marriage because they are afraid of 
being rejected for new insurance policies after their divorce due to pre-existing 
conditions. However, COBRA allows divorcees to stay on their ex-spouse’s ESI 
2 The first-step coefficient for the dependent group is the estimated coefficient of the interaction terms 
between the treatment group (coverage dependence group) dummy and age (the age of the older spouse) 
using the two-step estimation method; the first-step coefficient for the non-dependent group is defined 
similarly for the control group without such an ESI coverage dependence. The difference in the first-step 
coefficients for the dependent and non-dependent groups refers to the difference in the first-step coefficients 
estimates for the two groups. 
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coverage for up to three years by paying 102% of the full premium themselves, which is 
nevertheless more affordable than the plans on the non-group market. Under this 
arrangement, divorcees will furthermore not be rejected for coverage based on pre-
existing conditions. Due to COBRA policies, the cost of divorce falls as people approach 
age 65, and so divorce rates begin to trend upward starting at age 62, rather than 
exhibiting a perfect spike at age 65.  
In addition, consistent with Figure 3, the econometrics presented in Table 3 show 
that 65 is the most important age. Table 3 reports the results of a test of the spike and 
shift in Figure 3, as well as a placebo test for other ages, which regress the difference in 
the first-step coefficients between two groups on the age trend, an age dummy for age X 
(X=58, 59…71), and a post-65 dummy. Specification 8 is the key regression, which 
includes a dummy for age 65, that test for the spike at age 65 and the shift after age 65. 
All other specifications are placebo tests for other ages. The results in Table 3 show that 
from age 58 to 71, only the coefficient for the age 65 dummy is significant and has the 
largest effect (about 8%). Coefficients of dummies for other ages are not significant and 
are much smaller in magnitude.  
Figure 3 and Table 3 confirm the prediction that there will be a spike in the 
divorce flow at age 65 for individuals with spousal coverage dependence. Figure 3 also 
shows a higher level of divorce flow after age 65 than before age 65, although the 
estimated coefficient for the post-65 dummy is not statistically significant in Table 3. 
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Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
For individuals with spousal coverage dependence, some may also have other 
public health insurance for themselves, such as Medicaid or Medicare obtained before 
age 65 because of disabilities. Individuals with their own sources of public health 
insurance are supposed to be less dependent on spousal coverage and thus less affected 
by marriage lock. Individuals with spousal coverage dependence face a potential 
disruption in health insurance coverage when leaving their current marriage, whereas 
individuals with their own public health insurance coverage may not face that disruption. 
Thus, individuals who rely on their spouse’s health insurance coverage and do not have 
access to an alternative plan may be more likely to be deterred from divorce because of 
health insurance coverage issues before age 65.  
Therefore, I use the triple-difference model in Eq. 1.5 to estimate the interaction 
among the age 65 cutoff dummy variable, the spousal ESI coverage dependence group 
dummy, and the “lacking other public health insurance coverage” group dummy. The 
“lacking other public health insurance coverage” group is defined as individuals who do 
not have Medicaid or “pre-65” Medicare. The coefficients on the interaction term shown 
in Table 4 are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that among individuals 
with spousal ESI coverage dependence, those with a single source of spousal ESI 
coverage are approximately 6% more likely to divorce when they qualify for Medicare at 
age 65 than those with other public health insurance, such as Medicaid or Medicare 
obtained before age 65. In Table 4, the positive and significant estimated effects are 
robust for all specifications, which suggests that a lack of access to one’s own health 
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insurance is a disincentive to divorce before age 65 for those with spousal coverage 
dependence. 
Table 5 reports the triple-difference estimates from Eq. 1.5 using both “whether 
either spouse’s age is equal to age 65” and “whether either spouse’s age is older than age 
66” as the age cutoff dummies for Medicare qualification. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms of the age 65 cutoff dummy variable, the spousal ESI coverage 
dependence group dummy, and the “lacking other public health insurance coverage” 
group dummy are also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that among 
individuals with spousal ESI coverage dependence, those that only have spousal ESI 
coverage are approximately 8% more likely to divorce when they qualify for Medicare at 
age 65 than people with other public health insurance, such as Medicaid or Medicare 
obtained before age 65. Furthermore, the estimates show that they are approximately 5% 
more likely to divorce after age 65. 
Potentially Confounding Factors 
The changes in the probability of divorce observed around age 65 may be due to 
other changes in work status or social security benefits, which may be a concern. For 
instance, individuals may divorce at age 65 because of their transition to retirement, 
which may be irrelevant to qualifying for Medicare. Thus, I must investigate whether 
other confounding factors exist that cause changes in marriage behavior around the time 
individuals turn 65. To determine if these factors drive the results, I include controls for 
retirement, full retirement (i.e., whether the individual is retired at the full retirement 
age), and social security in my regressions. 
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To investigate whether retiring or dropping out of the work force affects the 
divorce decision at age 65, I control for retirement in my regression. The estimates are 
reported in all specifications (Tables 1-5). I find positive coefficient estimates on the 
retirement variable that are not significant for most specifications; however, the key 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term between the age cutoff for Medicare and the 
spousal coverage dependence group remains significant and robust,3 which suggests that 
retirement is not responsible for the primary changes in marriage behavior at age 65. 
The effect of Medicare coverage on late-life divorce may be underestimated 
because individuals who retire because they qualify for Medicare at age 65 may decide to 
divorce later because of problems and conflicts occurring after retirement. Thus, this kind 
of divorce flow may be attributed to the effect of Medicare eligibility at age 65 on late-
life divorce. 
Another major concern is that other confounding factors might exist that lead to 
changes in marriage behavior at age 65, such as social security benefits. This is because 
there is a social security rule about full retirement that could create an incentive to 
divorce under social security at full retirement age. The full retirement age for full social 
security benefits is the age at which a person may first become entitled to full or 
unreduced retirement benefits; this age is approximately 66 for individuals in my dataset. 
The rule suggests that, people aged 62 or older and unmarried after divorce could receive 
3 As a further test, I excluded retirement in the estimation, and obtained estimates similar to those reported 
in Table 1-5 (where retirement is included) for the interaction term between age cutoff for Medicare and the 
spousal coverage dependence group. The results remain robust regardless of whether I control for social 
security or full retirement in the estimation. 
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social security benefits on his/her ex-spouse's record after divorce (even if the ex-spouse 
has remarried), as long as the ex-spouse is entitled to social security retirement benefits 
and the marriage lasted 10 years or longer.4 
The coefficients on social security income reported in all specifications of Tables 
1-5 are negative and insignificant, suggesting that individuals may be less likely to get 
divorced with higher social security benefits. The coefficient on full retirement is also 
negative and insignificant, suggesting that individuals are less likely to divorce at their 
full retirement age, that is, at age 66 in my sample. A possible explanation is that 
individuals with an incentive to divorce who stay in marriage may treat the marriage as 
something from which they would like to escape. There are two exits to escaping the 
marriage: qualifying for Medicare at age 65 or reaching full retirement at age 66. The 
social security rule suggests that divorce at age 65 does not affect the social security 
benefits they receive from their ex-spouses at age 66. Therefore, individuals with 
incentives for divorce use the exit at age 65 by qualifying for Medicare to escape 
marriage. Hence, very few remain to use the second exit at age 66, that is, at full 
retirement age. 
In summary, the addition of the covariates does not have a significant effect on 
the estimated relationship between the key interaction term and divorce flow. The 
coefficient estimates on the interaction term between the age cutoff for the Medicare 
dummy and the spousal coverage dependence group dummy remain significant and 
4  Refer to “Retirement Planner: If You Are Divorced” on the official U.S. Social Security website: 
http://www.ssa. gov/retire2/divspouse.htm. 
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robust, which rules out the possibility that retirement, full retirement, and social security 
benefits generate the main changes in marriage behavior around age 65. 
Simulation for Robustness Check 
One limitation of using panel data from the HRS is the reliance on the distribution 
assumptions for the respondents’ ages of divorce. Thus, I use a simulation to run the 
probability assignment process 10,000 times. I find roughly similar-sized point estimates, 
as shown in Table 6, which reports the simulated results for both one-step OLS 
estimators and two-step estimators for both DID and triple-difference models, which are 
consistent with previous estimation results. Panel A reports the coefficient and standard 
errors for the key independent variable, which is the interaction term between the age ≥ 
65 cutoff dummy variable and the spousal coverage dependence group dummy in DID 
estimations, or the interaction term among the age ≥ 65 cutoff dummy variable, the 
spousal coverage dependence group dummy, and the “without other public health 
insurance” group dummy in the triple-difference estimations. Similarly, Panel B reports 
the coefficient and standard errors for the key independent variable, which is the 
interaction term between the two age cutoff dummies (i.e., age = 65 and age ≥ 66) and the 
spousal coverage dependence group dummy in the DID estimations, and the interaction 
term among the two cutoff dummy variables, the spousal coverage dependence group 
dummy, and the “without other public health insurance” group dummy in the triple-
difference estimations. In general, the simulated estimates in Table 6 show robustness; 
and the results do not appear sensitive to changes of covariates and estimation methods. 
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All the estimates in the first section rely on the assumption that potential 
divorcees rely heavily on Medicare coverage rather than on other possible sources of 
health insurance coverage after divorce. The best protection against insurance loss for 
those individuals is stable long-term employment in jobs that offer a direct source of 
insurance coverage. Although some spouses may actively look for jobs with health 
insurance during a divorce, it is unlikely that this search drives the entire relationship, 
especially in late adulthood. I do not capture the effect from divorcees who concurrently 
find insured jobs during or after the divorce. 
Conclusion 
Parameter estimates in the first chapter imply that age eligibility for Medicare 
among married couples aged 60 to 70 with spousal coverage dependence increases the 
probability of divorce by 7 percentage points. I also find that the divorce flow rates at age 
65 when people qualify for Medicare are substantially lower among those who have their 
own public insurance as compared with those who have insurance coverage only through 
a spouse. 
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Table 1: DID Estimates of Divorce Rate for Medicare Eligibility (Age>=65) 
Whether the Individual Is 
   
OLS Two Step Estimator 
Recently Divorced (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Either Spouse’s Medicare -.0539*** -.0581*** -.0616*** -.0469*** 
Eligibility (Age >=65) (.0123) (.0123) (.0106) (.0127) 
Spousal Coverage Dependence 
 
-.0701*** -.0123*** -.0701*** -.0327** 
Group (.0032) (.0019) (.0067) (.0136) 
Spousal Coverage Dependence .0716*** .0708*** .0695*** .0650** 
* Either Spouse’s (Age>=65) (.0082) (.0078) (.0094) (.0293) 
Personal Income 3.84e-07*** 3.90e-07*** 3.86e-07*** 3.86e-07*** 
 (1.07e-07) (1.04e-07) (8.10e-08) (8.10e-08) 
Family Income -1.76e-07** -1.70e-07** -1.76e-07*** -1.76e-07*** 
 (6.62e-08) (6.28e-08) (2.61e-08) (2.61e-08) 
Education Level .0017* .0019* .0017* .0017* 
 (.0009) (.0009) (.0010) (.0010) 
Self-Reported Health Status .0036 .0033 .0037 .0037 
 (.0025) (.0025) (.0026) (.0026) 
Gender .0453*** .0425*** .0448*** .0448*** 
 (.0059) (.0058) (.0059) (.0059) 
Race 
 
 
-.0036 -.0029 -.0037 -.0037 
 
 
(.0076) (.0075) (.0053) (.0053) 
Disability .0156 .0151 .0149 .0149 
 (.0089) (.0088) (.0092) (.0092) 
Years Married -.0065*** -.0062*** -.0064*** -.0064*** 
 (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Times Married -.0120** -.0096* -.0118*** -.0118*** 
 (.0053) (.0051) (.0038) (.0038) 
Number of Children -.0081*** -.0080*** -.0080*** -.0080*** 
 (.0006) (.0006) (.0013) (.0013) 
Post-Retirement ESI -.0023 -.0022 -.0020 -.0020 
 (.0065) (.0066) (.0062) (.0062) 
Age -.0075*** -.0073*** -.0096*** -.0117*** 
 (.0016) (.0016) (.0012) (.0015) 
Retirement .0068 .0070 .0070 .0070 
 (.0050) (.0050) (.0045) (.0045) 
Social Security Income -.0033 -.0043 -.0035 -.0035 
 (.0034) (.0032) (.0080) (.0080) 
Full Retirement -.0023 -.0027 -.0020 -.0020 
 (.0023) (.0031) (.0050) (.0050) 
Group Specific Age Trend No Yes No Yes 
Note: Source: HRS 1992-2010. N=57,480. Age Range is 60 to 70. Individuals in the sample are either married or divorced. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust, 
clustered by age and are shown in parentheses. In the two-step estimator specifications, the estimates for the first three key 
independent variables are reported from the second step, and all others estimates are reported from the first step. 
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Table 2: DID Estimates of Divorce Rate for Medicare Eligibility (Age=65) and 
(Age>=66) 
Whether the Individual Is Recently 
 
OLS Two Step Estimator 
Divorced (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Either Spouse’s Medicare -.0597*** .0613*** -.0674*** -.0551*** 
Eligibility (Age =65) (.0137) (.0143) (.0148) (.0140) 
Either Spouse’s Medicare -.0501*** -.0559*** -.0612*** -.0381** 
Eligibility (Age >=66) (.0129) (.0128) (.0124) (.0142) 
Spousal Coverage Dependence Group -.0701*** -.0113*** -.0701*** -.0445*** 
 (.0033) (.0019) (.0069) (.0146) 
Spousal Coverage Dependence .0815*** .0741*** .0821*** .0775*** 
* Either Spouse’s (Age =65) (.0128) (.0118) (.0194) (.0267) 
Spousal Coverage Dependence .0672*** .0649*** .0673*** .0612 
*Either Spouse’s (Age >=66) (.0082) (.0075) (.0101) (.0580) 
Personal Income 3.84e-07*** 3.90e-07*** 3.86e-07*** 3.86e-07*** 
 (1.07e-07) (1.04e-07) (8.10e-08) (8.10e-08) 
Family Income -1.76e-07** -1.70e-07** -1.76e-07*** -1.76e-07*** 
 (6.61e-08) (6.27e-08) (2.61e-08) (2.61e-08) 
Education Level .0017* .0019* .0017* .0017* 
 (.0009) (.0009) (.0010) (.0010) 
Self-Reported Health Status .0036 .0033 .0037 .0037 
 (.0025) (.0025) (.0026) (.0026) 
Gender .0454*** .0425*** .0448*** .0448*** 
 (.0058) (.0057) (.0059) (.0059) 
Race 
 
 
-.0036 -.0030 -.0037 -.0037 
 
 
(.0076) (.0075) (.0053) (.0053) 
Disability .0159 .0151 .0149 .0149 
 (.0090) (.0088) (.0092) (.0092) 
Years Married -.0065*** -.0062*** -.0064*** -.0064*** 
 (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Times Married -.0120** -.0096* -.0118*** -.0118*** 
 (.0053) (.0051) (.0038) (.0038) 
Number of Children -.0081*** -.0080*** -.0080*** -.0080*** 
 (.0005) (.0005) (.0013) (.0013) 
Post-Retirement ESI -.0023 -.0022 -.0020 -.0020 
 (.0065) (.0066) (.0062) (.0062) 
Age -.0076*** -.0074*** -.0095*** -.0126*** 
 (.0016) (.0016) (.0013) (.0017) 
Retirement .0069 .0070 .0070 .0070 
 (.0051) (.0050) (.0045) (.0045) 
Social Security Income -.0033 -.0042 -.0035 -.0035 
 (.0034) (.0032) (.0080) (.0080) 
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Full Retirement -.0023 -.0026 -.0020 -.0020 
 (.0023) (.0033) (.0050) (.0050) 
Year Effect & Cohort Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group Specific Age Trend No Yes No Yes 
Note: Source: HRS 1992-2010. N=57,480. Age Range is 60 to 70. Individuals in the sample are either married or divorced. *, 
** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Estimates are using the assumption with probabilities 
assigned for the age of divorce. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust, clustered by age and are shown in parentheses. 
For Specification for two-step estimator, the estimates for the first five key independent variables are reported from the second 
step, and all others estimates are reported from the first step.  
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Table 3: Estimates of the Difference of the First Step Coefficients for All Ages 
 
Note : Source: HRS 1992-2010. Individuals in the sample are either married or divorced. Spousal coverage dependence group 
refers to individuals who or whose spouses have a single source of health insurance from the spouse’s ESI coverage. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. “The first-step coefficient for dependent group” is the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction terms between treatment group (ESI Coverage Dependence Group) dummy and age (the older age 
of the spouses) by using the two-step estimation method; “The first-step coefficient for nondependent group” is defined similarly 
for the control group without such ESI coverage dependence. And the “difference in the first step coefficients for dependent and 
nondependent group” refers to the difference of the first-step coefficients estimates for the two groups, which is the dependent 
variables in the regressions. Independent variables include a age trend, an age dummy for age X (X=58, 59,…,71), and a post-
65 dummy. Specification 8 including a dummy for age 65 is the key regression, and all other specifications are placebo tests for 
other ages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Difference of the First (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Step Coefficients X= 58 X= 59 X= 60 X= 61 X= 62 X= 63 X= 64 
Age X Dummy .0197 -.01795 -.0262 -.0412 -.0083 -.0020 .0182 
 .0368 .0343 .0323 .0300 .0326 .0334 .0343 
Post Age 65 Dummy -.0130 -.0043 -.0060 -.0101 -.0089 -.0079 .0003 
 .0335 .0323 .0313 .0296 .0327 .0338 .0349 
Age Trend .0086* .0066 .0067 .0071* .0075* .0074* .0066 
 .0045 .0042 .0039 .0036 .0040 .0040 .0042 
Adjusted R Squared .3912 .3904 .4123 .0473 .0777 .3739 .3910 
Number of Observations 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
        
The Difference of the First (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Step Coefficients X= 65 X= 66 X= 67 X= 68 X= 69 X= 70 X= 71 
Age X Dummy .0799*** .0443 .0345 -.0112 -.0037 -.0319 -.0424 
 .0254 .0312 .0311 .0333 .0335 .0327 .0332 
Post Age 65 Dummy .0353 -.0323 -.0200 -.0048 -.0069 -.0077 -.0128 
 .0280 .0318 .0323 .0329 .0324 .0308 .0302 
Age Trend .0027 .0097** .0083* .0073* .0074* .0082* .0092** 
 .0033 .0037 .0038 .0039 .0040 .0039 .0039 
Adjusted R Squared .6582 .5169 .4459 .3806 .3745 .4282 .4617 
Number of Observations 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
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Table 4: Triple Difference Estimates of Divorce Rate for Medicare Eligibility 
(Age>=65) 
Whether the Individual Is Recently Divorced OLS Two Step Estimator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Either Spouse’s Medicare -.0027 -.0028 -.0029 -.0029 
Eligibility (Age >=65) (.0156) (.0149) (.0145) (.0143) 
Spousal Coverage Dependence Group -.0062* -.0062** -.0065 -.0076 
 (.0034) (.0021) (.0091) (.0129) 
Having Neither Medicaid nor Medicare before .0684*** .0746*** .0791*** .0741*** 
Age 65 (.0162) (.0154) (.0120) (.0124) 
Spousal Coverage Dependence* Either Spouse’s .0761*** .0631*** .0766*** .0567** 
(Age >=65)* Having No Medicaid or Medicare (.0104) (.0082) (.0182) (.0228) 
Personal Income 3.73e-07*** 3.79e-07*** 3.75e-07*** 3.75e-07*** 
 (1.04e-07) (1.01e-07) (8.10e-08) (8.10e-08) 
Family Income -1.75e-07** -1.68e-07** -1.75e-07** -1.75e-07** 
 (6.62e-08) (6.26e-08) (2. 61e-08) (2. 61e-08) 
Education Level .0015 .0017* .0015 .0015 
 (.0009) (.0009) (.0010) (.0010) 
Self-Reported Health Status .0042 .0040 .0044* .0044* 
 (.0025) (.0025) (.0026) (.0026) 
Gender .0456*** .0425*** .0449*** .0449*** 
 (.0061) (.0060) (.0059) (.0059) 
Race 
 
 
-.0029 -.0022 -.0032 -.0032 
 
 
(.0075) (.0074) (.0053) (.0053) 
Disability .0281** .0284** .0269* .0269* 
 (.0093) (.0093) (.0097) (.0097) 
Years Married -.0064*** -.0061*** -.0064*** -.0064*** 
 (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Times Married -.0115* -.0090 -.0113*** -.0113*** 
 (.0005) (.0051) (.0038) (.0038) 
Number of Children -.0079*** -.0079*** -.0078*** -.0078*** 
 (.0005) (.0005) (.0013) (.0013) 
Post-Retirement ESI -.0015 -.0014 -.0012 -.0012 
 (.0064) (.0065) (.0062) (.0062) 
Age -.0074*** -.0073*** -.0071*** -.0085*** 
 (.0016) (.0016) (.0016) (.0019) 
Retirement .0073 .0076 .0076* .0076* 
 (.0049) (.0048) (.0045) (.0045) 
Social Security Income -.0019 -.0028 -.0019 -.0019 
 (.0037) (.0035) (.0080) (.0080) 
Full Retirement -.0023 -.0024 -.0022 -.0022 
 (.0023) (.0025) .(0039) .(0039) 
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Year Effect & Cohort Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group Specific Age Trend No Yes No Yes 
Note: Source: HRS 1992-2010. N=57,480. Age Range is 60 to 70. Individuals in the sample are either married 
or divorced. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Estimates are using the 
assumption with probabilities assigned for the age of divorce. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust, 
clustered by age and are shown in parentheses. All specifications also include controls for interaction terms 
among Having Neither Medicaid nor Medicare before Age 65 group dummy, Spousal Coverage Dependence 
Group dummy, and Either Spouse’ Medicare Eligibility age dummy. For Specification for two-step estimator, 
the estimates for the first four key independent variables are reported from the second step, and all others 
estimates are reported from the first step.  
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Table 5: Triple Difference Estimates of Divorce Rate for Medicare Eligibility (Age=65) 
and (Age>=66) 
Whether the Individual Is Recently Divorced OLS Two Step Estimator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Either Spouse’s Medicare -.0111 -.0122 -.0027 -.0083 
Eligibility (Age =65) (.0205) (.0193) (.0147) (.0145) 
Either Spouse’s Medicare -.0095 -.0097 -.0069 -.0071 
Eligibility (Age >=66) (.0152) (.0147) (.0169) (.0167) 
Spousal Coverage Dependence  -.0221* -.0267* -.0212 -.0194 
 (.0121) (.0136) (.0137) (.0135) 
Having Neither Medicaid nor Medicare before .0683*** .0745*** .0800*** .0746*** 
Age 65 (.0161) (.0153) (.0123) (.0127) 
Spousal Coverage Dependence* Either Spouse’s .0871*** .0796*** .0889** .0764** 
(Age =65)* Having No Medicaid nor Medicare (.0158) (.0145) (.0375) (.0379) 
Spousal Coverage Dependence* Either Spouse’s .0710*** .0599*** .0745*** .0512** 
(Age >=66)* Having No Medicaid nor Medicare (.0098) (.0076) (.0195) (.0248) 
Personal Income 3.73e-07*** 3.79e-07*** 3.75e-07*** 3.75e-07*** 
 (1.04e-07) (1.01e-07) (8.10e-08) (8.10e-08) 
Family Income -1.75e-07** -1.68e-07** -1.75e-07** -1.75e-07** 
 (6.62e-08) (6.26e-08) (2. 61e-08) (2. 61e-08) 
Education Level .0015 .0017 .0015 .0015 
 (.0019) (.0009) (.0010) (.0010) 
Self-Reported Health Status .0043 .0040 .0044* .0044* 
 (.0026) (.0025) (.0026) (.0026) 
Gender .0456*** .0426*** .0449*** .0449*** 
 (.0060) (.0059) (.0059) (.0059) 
Race 
 
 
-.0029 -.0022 -.0032 -.0032 
 
 
(.0075) (.0074) (.0053) (.0053) 
Disability .0281** .0283** .0269* .0269* 
 (.0094) (.0093) (.0097) (.0097) 
Years Married -.0064*** -.0061*** -.0064*** -.0064*** 
 (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Times Married -.0115** -.0090 -.0113*** -.0113*** 
 (.0053) (.0051) (.0038) (.0038) 
Number of Children -.0080*** -.0079*** -.0078*** -.0078*** 
 (.0005) (.0005) (.0013) (.0013) 
Post-Retirement ESI -.0016 -.0014 -.0012 -.0012 
 (.0064) (.0064) (.0062) (.0062) 
Age -.0075*** -.0073*** -.0076*** -.0092*** 
 (.0016) (.0016) (.0019) (.0021) 
Retirement .0073 .0075 .0076* .0076* 
 (.0049) (.0048) (.0045) (.0045) 
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Social Security Income -.0018 -.0027 -.0019 -.0019 
 (.0037) (.0035) (.0080) (.0080) 
Fully Retirement -.0023 -.0025 -.0026 -.0026 
 (.0024) (.0026) .(0049) .(0049) 
Year Effect & Cohort Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group Specific Age Trend No Yes No Yes 
Note: Source: HRS 1992-2010. N=57,480. Age Range is 60 to 70. Individuals in the sample are either married or 
divorced. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Estimates are using the assumption 
with probabilities assigned for the age of divorce. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust, clustered by 
age and are shown in parentheses. All specifications also include controls for interaction terms among Having 
Neither Medicaid nor Medicare before Age 65 group dummy, Spousal Coverage Dependence Group dummy, and 
Either Spouse’ Medicare Eligibility age dummies. For Specification for two-step estimator, the estimates for the 
first six key independent variables are reported from the second step, and all others estimates are reported from 
the first step.  
 
 
 
Table 6: Simulation Results of Regression Discontinuity Estimates for 
Medicare Eligibility 
Note: Source: HRS 1992-2010. N=57,480. Simulation Times: 10,000. Age Range is 60 to 70. Individuals in the 
sample are either married or divorced. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust and clustered by age. The 
regressions are based on the assumption that people could get divorced in the full past year with probability 0.5, 
in the current interview year with probability 0.25, or in two years before the interview year with probability 0.25. 
For all regressions, the dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual got divorced 
recently between the interview waves; the main independent variables are the interaction terms among Having 
Neither Medicaid nor Medicare before Age 65 group dummy, Spousal Coverage Dependence Group dummy, and 
Either Spouse’ Medicare Eligibility age dummies, with coefficients and standard errors reported in the table. Other 
important control variables include age, income, education, gender, race, disability, years married, times married, 
number of children, health status, retirement, private health insurance coverage, social security benefits and full 
retirement. All regressions control for year and region fixed effects, as well as spousal coverage group specific 
age trend. 
Panel A: Either Spouse’ DID (OLS) DID (2-Step) Triple Diff 
 
Triple Diff (2-Step) 
Medicare Eligibility (Age>=65) Mean Std. 
 
Mean Std. 
 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Coef. for Key Interaction (Age>=65) .0672 .0014 .0651 .0013 .0588 .0012 .0514 .0012 
Std. Err. for Key Interaction 
 
.0071 .0004 .0280 .0081 .0077 .0004 .0215 .0014 
Group Specific Age Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Panel B: Either Spouse’ Medicare DID (OLS) DID (2-Step) Triple Diff 
 
Triple Diff (2-Step) 
Eligibility (Age=65) & (Age>=66) Mean Std. 
 
Mean Std. 
 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Coef. for Key Interaction (Age=65) .0718 .0035 .0735 .0031 .0778 .0036 .0732 .0032 
Std. Err. for Key Interaction (Age=65) .0095 .0012 .0245 .0076 .0092 .0012 .0314 .0047 
Coef. for Key Interaction (Age>=66) .0612 .0012 .0603 .0018 .0567 .0012 .0496 .0048 
Std. Err. for Key Interaction 
 
.0066 .0004 .0512 .0094 .0064 .0004 .0229 .0038 
Group Specific Age Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Figure 1: Health Insurance Premiums for Potential Divorcees by Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Net Utility Gain from Marriage for Potential Divorcees by Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀 − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 ≥ 0, Stay Married.  
 
 
   
                                       𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀 − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 < 0, Divorce.   
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Figure 3: Difference in the First Step Coefficients for Spousal Coverage 
Dependent Group and Non-Dependent Group 
 
Note: Source: HRS 1992-2010. Individuals in the sample are either married or 
divorced. Spousal coverage dependence group refers to individuals who or whose 
spouses have a single source of health insurance from the spouse’s ESI coverage. “The 
first-step coefficient for dependent group” is the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction terms among treatment group (ESI Coverage Dependence Group) dummy, 
and age (the older age of the spouses) derived from the two-step estimation method. 
“The first-step coefficient for nondependent group” is defined similarly for the control 
group without such ESI coverage dependence. And the “difference in the first-step 
coefficients for dependent and nondependent group” is the difference of the first-step 
coefficients estimates for the two groups. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Introduction 
 This issue of marriage lock in the first chapter has taken on new salience with the 
passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). Under ACA, access to high-quality, 
subsidized health insurance coverage is no longer exclusively tied to employment. 
Individual consumers can purchase health insurance through state or federal “health 
insurance exchanges,” and neither pre-existing condition exclusions nor premiums based 
on health status are permitted. Furthermore, under this act, the government provides 
subsidies to qualifying low- and moderate-income individuals to increase the 
affordability of such coverage. With the health insurance exchange market, individuals 
can buy health insurance coverage directly from the exchanges and become less 
dependent on a spouse’s healthcare insurance or ESI. In addition, the individual mandate 
under the health care reform makes health insurance coverage mandatory, which 
strengthens the importance of health insurance coverage on marriage behavior. The ACA 
has the potential to weaken the marriage lock; thus, studying the effects of health 
insurance coverage on marriage behavior in the health insurance exchange market is 
important. 
In this second chapter, the effects of health insurance coverage on marriage behavior 
are likely influenced by the current healthcare reform. In many ways, the ACA reforms 
were modeled on Massachusetts’s comprehensive approaches to expanding health 
insurance coverage. The Massachusetts healthcare insurance reform law, enacted in 2006, 
mandates that nearly every resident of Massachusetts obtain a state government-regulated 
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minimum level of healthcare insurance coverage. Furthermore, the law provides free 
healthcare insurance for residents earning less than 150% of the federal poverty level 
(FPL). Among its many effects, the law established Massachusetts’s exchange market, 
the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority (known as the Connector), 
which offers private insurance plans to residents. In the second section of this paper, 
Massachusetts is used as the treatment group and compared with other states without 
such healthcare reform. I use the DID approach for changes in Massachusetts residents’ 
marriage behavior from 2006 as a function of access to alternative health insurance 
coverage in the state’s Connector exchange market. Unlike the first chapter, here, 
available data require that I focus on divorce and marriage levels (i.e., the fraction of the 
population that is divorced or married, rather than flows of newly divorced and newly 
married). Estimates in the second section suggest that the incentives for marriage 
improve under the 2006 Massachusetts health care reform; the share of the population 
divorced in Massachusetts has declined by approximately 0.5% since 2006, and the share 
married has increased by approximately 1.4%. 
The results from these two chapters shed light on whether the current health 
insurance system affects marriage behavior in the United States. The results suggest that 
health insurance coverage may serve as a marriage lock, possibly due to the high cost of 
health insurance. When alternative cheap or almost free health insurance plans are 
available, such as Medicare, couples may be more likely to divorce. In contrast, an 
individual mandate requires nearly everyone to purchase health insurance coverage, 
although insurance plans on the health exchange market may still be relatively expensive 
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despite government subsidies. Marrying or remaining married to someone who is eligible 
for employer-sponsored insurance may be the lowest cost way for those who are not 
previously insured to obtain coverage, particularly when they are middle to upper income 
individuals not eligible for subsidies. Importantly, these results suggest that the ACA 
reforms may result in individuals becoming more likely to get or stay married. 
This is a promising direction for future research, and much is to be gained from an 
investigation of whether and how health insurance coverage empirically influences 
marriage behavior. The results from the first two chapters suggest that the past emphasis 
of the United States on ESI may limit the flexibility of marriage and influence decisions 
of individuals regarding marriage and divorce; the results are of considerable interest to 
policymakers who promote marriage and marital stability. In contrast, understanding the 
effects of allowing spousal coverage through ESI and changes in the health insurance 
markets on marriage behavior is becoming increasingly important as the US continues to 
restructure its health care system. 
Model 
The basic model in the first chapter can also be applied in the second chapter to 
invistigate the effect of the health insurance exchange on divorce and marriage decisions. 
In other words, the model allows for changes over time in the utility of marriage and in 
the premiums available on various health insurance markets. 
In the second chapter, I expand the model for marriage behavior on the health 
insurance exchange market by taking into account the ongoing reform in the health 
insurance system. Under the health care reform, the individual mandate requires almost 
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everyone to have health insurance. The health insurance exchange market will provide 
subsidized health insurance plans to low-income individuals, while people with the 
lowest incomes will get free health care. 
Because the health care reform and exchange will affect individuals differently, I 
assume there are three different subgroups in the population according to income. The 
first subgroup has the lowest income level, i.e., under 150% of the federal poverty line 
(FPL), and can obtain almost free public health. The second subgroup has the second 
lowest income level, i.e., between 150% and 300% of the FPL, and this group of 
individuals can buy subsidized health insurance plans on the exchange. The third 
subgroup consists of individuals with higher incomes, i.e., above 300% of the FPL and 
these individuals will not have access to the subsided insurance plans on the exchange. 
For simplicity, I will call these groups the low-income group, the medium-income group, 
and the high-income group, respectively. 
As in the first chapter, I assume single individuals will choose the cheapest health 
insurance available to them, while individuals who are married have ESI coverage and 
will not change their plan choice. That is,   
𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 = 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,  
𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐿𝐿 = 0,  
𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝑀𝑀 = 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀,  
𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐻𝐻 = 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  
and 0 < 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 < 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 < 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
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Individuals will decide between marriage and remaining single by comparing the 
utility gain from marriage with zero. Now I have, 
𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀 − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 = 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 − 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 + (𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆 − 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀) = 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀 − 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 + �𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 − 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸� = ∆𝑉𝑉 + ∆𝜋𝜋       (2.1) 
For the low-income group, single individuals can get free health insurance if they 
remain in this low-income category. Here, marriage may potentially increase their 
household income level, thereby eliminating access to free health insurance. In that case, 
∆𝜋𝜋 = 0 − 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 < 0,  
and the marriage incentive may decrease for those individuals in this category. 
For the medium-income group, single individuals will be able to buy health 
insurance on the health insurance exchange. The premium that they will face on the 
exchange will be lower than the premium on the non-group market, since government 
subsidies will make coverage on the exchange more affordable. However, even the 
subsidized health insurance plans on the exchange are still more costly than employer-
sponsored health insurance, at least in the current reform stage. That is,  
∆𝜋𝜋 = 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 − 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 > 0,  
and a positive ∆π will make the individuals prefer married life to single life. 
For the high-income group, single individuals still face the individual non-group 
market as they did before the health reform. Since  
∆𝜋𝜋 = 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 > 0,  
individuals are more likely to get or stay married. 
In the early stage of health care reform, the cost of health insurance on exchanges is 
still higher than the cost of employer-sponsored health insurance. As long as ∆π >0 for 
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most people, incentives for marriage will increase while incentive for divorce will 
decrease on the exchange. 
Because the 2006 Massachusetts health care reform made different health insurance 
plans available across income groups, the divorce and marriage decisions for individuals 
belonging to the three income groups could be quite different. For simplicity, I assume 
the husband (or the fiancé) always earns at least as much money as the wife (or the 
fiancée) earns, i.e. 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊, and vice versa. I will denote individuals with income below 
150% of the FPL as the low income group, individuals with income between 150% and 
300% of the FPL as the middle income group, and individuals with income above 300% 
of the FPL as the high income group. 
I now discuss marriage decisions under the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform 
for individuals belonging to different income groups in the following scenarios: 
1. 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 ≤ 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 ≤ 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
a. 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 ≤ 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
If the household income after marriage is still below 150%, the couple could get free 
health insurance under the reform. There will not much incentive caused by the reform to 
change an individual’s marriage behavior. 
b. 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 < 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 ≤ 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
Individuals with relatively higher income may be reluctant to get married because of 
the high premium on the individual nongroup market. However, the cost of marriage goes 
down for couples because they could can obtain subsidized health insurance coverage in 
the health insurance exchange market under the reform.  
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2. 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 < 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 ≤ 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 < 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 ≤ 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, and 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 >300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
If the couple did not obtain ESI coverage from their employers, the couple would 
probably be more likely to stay single, because they could get the subsidized health 
insurance plans on the exchange market while they may face expensive insurance plans 
on the non-group market after marriage, i.e. π𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀. If one of the couple 
had ESI coverage, the couple is more likely to get married in response to the individual 
mandate, since π𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 < 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀.  
3. 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, and 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
Since the household income after marriage is still above 300% of the FPL, the 
couple could not get the subsidized health insurance plans under the reform. There will 
not be much incentive caused by the reform to change an individual’s marriage behavior. 
4. 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 < 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 ≤ 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 < 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
a. 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 < 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 ≤ 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
If the couple did not have ESI coverage, they may be reluctant to get married 
because of the high premium on the individual nongroup market. However, the cost of 
marriage goes down for the couple because they could obtain subsidized health insurance 
coverage in the health insurance exchange market under the reform. Therefore, I expect 
more individuals being married in the middle-income group. If one of the couple (e.g.,the 
man) had ESI coverage, they are also more likely to be married to get ESI coverage for 
the uninsured individual in response to the individual mandate, since π𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 < 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀. 
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b. 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
If the couple did not have ESI coverage before the reform, they could not get the 
subsided health insurance plans on the exchange market and they may still face the 
expensive insurance plans on the nongroup market. Therefore, there will not be much 
incentive caused by the reform to change these individuals’ marriage behavior. If one of 
the couple (e.g.,the man) has ESI, the couple may not change their marriage behavior 
under the healthcare reform, since the previously uninsured woman could get free health 
insurance coverage under the reform. 
5. 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 < 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 < 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
If the couple did not have ESI coverage before the reform, they would probably stay 
single since at least the woman could get the subsidized health insurance coverage in the 
health insurance exchange market under the reform. However, if one of the couple, e.g. 
the man had ESI coverage, the couple is more likely to be married to have the spousal 
health insurance, since π𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 < 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀. 
6. 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 < 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
If the couple did not have ESI coverage before the reform, they would probably stay 
single since the woman could get free health insurance coverage under the reform. If one 
of the couple (e.g.,the man) had ESI coverage, and the woman could get free health 
insurance coverage under the reform, there will not be much incentive caused by the 
reform to change this couple’s marriage behavior. 
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Next, I discuss the divorce decisions for different income groups under the 2006 
Massachusetts healthcare reform in the following. I assume here that individuals who 
stay married could obtain the ESI coverage. 
1. 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 ≤ 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹: 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 ≤ 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 ≤ 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  
No matter whether divorced or not, the couple could always get free health 
insurance under the reform. There will not be much incentive caused by the reform to 
change the individuals’ divorce decision. 
2. 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 < 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
a. 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 ≤ 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 ≤ 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
The couple would probably be more likely to get divorced, since now they could get 
free health insurance after divorce under the reform. I expect that more couples will get 
divorced and stay in the low income group after divorce from the previous middle-
income group, which is associated with a decreased divorce rate for the middle-income 
group. 
b. 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 < 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 ≤ 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  
The wife would probably have an increased incentive for divorce, because she could 
receive free health insurance coverage after divorce under the healthcare reform.  
3. 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  
a. 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
The dependent spouse will not get the subsided insurance plans after divorce and 
may face the expensive nongroup individual health insurance market after divorce. Thus, 
the couple is more likely to stay married, since π𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸. 
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b. 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 < 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 ≤ 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 < 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 ≤ 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
The dependent spouse will get the subsidized insurance plans in the insurance 
exchange market after divorce, so the change in the cost before and after reform may 
influence some individual’s divorce decision if they are really close to the boundary 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀 = 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆. However, for other individuals, the health insurance plans on the 
exchange market are still relatively expensive, though government subsidies make them 
more affordable. Thus, the couple is more likely to stay married, since π𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 >
𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸. c. 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 < 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
The wife probably would have an increased incentive for divorce, because she could 
get free health insurance coverage after divorce under the healthcare reform.  d. 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 > 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 < 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 < 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
The couple would probably be more likely to stay married under the reform, since 
the dependent spouse may choose to get spousal ESI coverage other than getting the 
subsidized plans on the exchange market because π𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 > 𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 . 
e. 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻 < 300%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 ≤ 150%𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
The couple would probably be more likely to be divorced under the reform, since 
the dependent spouse could receive free health insurance coverage.  
Generally speaking, the health care reform could differentially affect individual’s 
marriage and divorce decisions across different income groups. The cost of marriage 
becomes lower for an individual belonging to the low- or the middle-income group, 
because of the subsided plans available in the health exchange market for the middle-
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income group. I expect to see more individuals from the low or the middle-income group 
to be married, and an increased marriage rate in the 150-300% FPL income group. For 
the divorce decisions, I will expect more couples from the middle-income group 
becoming divorced and staying in the low-income group after divorce, which is 
associated with a decreased divorce rate for the middle income group. 
Data 
For this chapter, I use the 2001–2011 American Community Survey (ACS), which 
includes households and people representing 1 percent of the American population for the 
11 years from 2001 to 2011. To study how marriage behavior is affected by the operation 
of an exchange market under the current healthcare reform, Massachusetts, with the first 
health exchange market (named “Connector”) open to residents in 2006 (and the only one 
before the ACA), is used as the treatment group. New Jersey and Connecticut are chosen 
as the control group, having the most similar divorce and marriage patterns to 
Massachusetts before 2006. Because the ACS does not attempt to re-interview the same 
individuals, my analysis examines the levels of marriage and divorce, not the flow of new 
divorces and marriages. Following convention, I call these marriage rates and divorce 
rates, but this needs to be understood as the levels, not flows. The ACS data sample that I 
use also has a very large sample size, and includes 329,666 observations in 
Massachusetts, 430,490 observations in New Jersey, and 174,789 observations in 
Connecticut. Focusing on both marriage and divorce rates, I construct the sample to 
include all individuals aged 20 to 64 in the treatment and control groups. I do not focus 
on people aged 65 and older in this analysis because individuals who are eligible for 
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Medicare should not be affected by the exchanges, which is confirmed by the additional 
analysis. 
Method 
For this chapter on the Massachusetts health exchange market, I use the DID method 
to study Massachusetts residents’ marriage behavior after the Connector exchange market 
became operational in 2006, comparing it with that in other states without health care 
reform. In addition, I use a triple difference approach to study how the variation has 
affected different age groups and income groups. 
Although there is considerable flexibility in the choice of control groups in a DID 
estimator, the comparability of the two groups is important to obtain a unbiased 
estimator. The key assumption, which is likely to hold only if the groups are comparable, 
is that the outcomes in the treatment and the control group follow the same time trend in 
the absence of the treatment. Figure 4 depicts the variation of divorce and marriage rates 
for Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Connecticut from 2001 to 2011.5 To better conduct 
the DID method used in this section, I choose New Jersey as the control group, the state 
with the most similar divorce and marriage patterns to Massachusetts before 2006, as 
shown in Figure 4, and I add Connecticut to the control group to increase the robustness 
of the analysis. The DID method allows me to consider the pre-existing differences 
5 In general, northeastern states have lower divorce rates because their citizens are more highly 
educated and tend to marry at older ages than do people in other regions. New Jersey, New York, and 
Massachusetts are among the wealthier states in the nation and economic stability also contributes to 
marital stability. Thus, I graph divorce and marriage rates for seven states: New York, New Jersey, 
Connecticut, Vermont, Maine, and New Hampshire. I find that New Jersey has the most similar pattern to 
Massachusetts regarding both marriage and divorce rates and Connecticut is the second most similar. 
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between the treatment and control groups and the general time trend by measuring 
divorce rates and marriage rates both before and after the implementation of the 
Connector health exchange market in the representative sample of both the participating 
(i.e., Massachusetts) and non-participating states (i.e., New Jersey and Connecticut). In 
general, I estimate the following DID model: 
𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇)𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖  + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖+ 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                   (2.2) 
where the dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  equals 1 if the individual is getting a divorce in the 
divorce estimation (or if the individual is getting married in the marriage estimation). 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is a dummy indicating whether the individual is in the treatment group, that is, a 
resident of Massachusetts. 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is a post-treatment dummy indicating whether the year 
is after 2006. 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of demographic characteristics and control variables. δs is 
the state effect, and λt is the year dummy. The coefficient on the interaction between 
Massachusetts residency and the availability of the Connector exchange market (since 
2006), β4, captures the DID estimate of the effect of healthcare reform on Massachusetts 
residents’ marriage behavior. 
The DID estimate for residents in Massachusetts does not take into account that the 
health care reform may have differentially affected the marriage behavior of residents of 
different income and age groups. For example, individuals below 150% of the FPL could 
get free health insurance under the reform. Likewise, subsidized health plans in the 
exchange are available to individuals who make below 300% of the FPL. There are three 
general income groups: under 150% of the FPL, between 150-300% of the FPL, and 
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above 300% of the FPL. I also create four age groups, comprising individuals aged 20-
29, aged 30-39, aged 40-49, and aged 50-64, respectively. The effects of health care 
reform on marriage behavior are predicted to be the most pronounced for individuals who 
could access the health insurance exchange market, i.e., those individuals between 150% 
and 300% of the FPL, while individuals below 150% of the FPL or above 300% of the 
FPL are not supposed to be affected as much. Furthermore, individuals aged 50-64 who 
have a higher demand for health insurance because of age but who are not yet eligible for 
Medicare should be affected the most. Similarly, young adults aged 20-29, many of 
whom did not have health insurance before the reform, may change their marriage 
behavior in response to the individual mandate after the reform. 
Thus, I use a triple-difference approach to study how the variation has affected 
different age and income groups. The triple difference estimates can adjust the simple 
before/after 2006 change in marriage and divorce rates for both general trends affecting 
Massachusetts residents, and trends differentially affecting individuals in different 
income and age groups. Empirically, I estimate the following triple difference model: 
𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇)𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽6(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺)𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺)𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖  + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2.3) 
where the dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  equals 1 if the individual is getting a divorce in the 
divorce estimation or if the individual is getting married in the marriage estimation. 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is a dummy indicating whether the individual is a resident of Massachusetts. 
𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is a post-treatment dummy indicating whether the year is after 2006. 𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is 
a full set of dummies indicating whether the individual is in a specific age or income 
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group. 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of demographic characteristics and control variables. δs is the 
state effect, and λt is the year dummy. The coefficient on the interaction among 
Massachusetts residency, the availability of the Connector exchange market (since 2006),  
and the dummy indicating a specific age or income group, β7, captures the triple 
difference estimate of the effect of healthcare reform on marriage behavior for the 
specific age or income group in Massachusetts. 
Out of concern that clustering breaks independence, that is, individual shocks within 
a given cluster (age or state) share a common component (an age-level/state-level shock), 
a two-step approach suggested by Donald and Lang (2007) is used for both chapters. I 
have few groups and a large number of observations for each group, and I make one more 
assumption — that is, that the cluster-level shocks have a normal distribution. Thus, the 
two-step estimator produces standard errors that appropriately consider the group-specific 
term. To implement the two-step estimator, I first regress the outcome variables on all 
individual-level variables and a full set of group dummies, or a full set of interaction 
terms involving group dummies. In the second stage, the estimated coefficients from 
these group dummies or a full set of dummies for the group-related interaction terms are 
used as the dependent variables, with all group-level variables as the independent 
variables. The resulting standard errors from this second-stage model are calculated 
considering the group component. Together with the second-stage coefficients, these 
form t-statistics that have a t distribution when the number of groups is small. In sum, the 
first-stage regression produces estimates of the group-level means after considering the 
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variation in the other individual controls. In the second stage, I estimate how much of this 
variation in these estimated group-level means is predicted by variation in groups. 
Results 
I study whether individuals living in Massachusetts, who could access the Connector 
health insurance exchange market since 2006, would be more likely to change their 
marriage status under the healthcare reform, as compared with individuals living in other 
states. The general approach adopted in the second chapter to identify the effect of health 
care reform on marriage behavior is to compare the divorce and marriage rates between 
the treatment group (i.e., residents of Massachusetts) who obtained additional access to 
health insurance plans in the health insurance exchange market under the 2006 reform, 
and a control group, which did not. 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates and State-Specific Time Trend 
Specifications 1 and 4, respectively, show the one-step OLS and two-step estimators 
for the DID estimation results of the divorce rates in Tables 7 and marriage rates in Table 
8 , between Massachusetts and New Jersey. The divorce estimates in Table 7 shows that 
the interactions between Massachusetts residency and the availability of the Connector 
exchange market since 2006 are negative and statistically significant for all 
specifications, suggesting that individuals are approximately 0.5% less likely to be 
divorced in Massachusetts under the 2006 health care reform.  
The marriage estimates in Table 8 show that the interaction between Massachusetts 
residency and the availability of the Connector exchange market since 2006 is positive 
and statistically significant across specifications. In Specification 4, the two-step 
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estimator for the interaction term suggests an approximate 1.5% increase in the marriage 
rate in Massachusetts since 2006. This suggests that providing additional access to health 
insurance coverage in the health insurance exchange market encourages marriage for 
residents of Massachusetts under the 2006 Massachusetts Health Care Reform. 
In Specification 2 of Tables 7 and 8, I allow for a state-specific time trend in 
estimating Equation 2.2, which provides estimates slightly larger than, and generally 
consistent with the results from other specifications. In general, these results show that 
individuals are approximately 1.5% more likely to be married and 0.5% less likely to be 
divorced in Massachusetts in the years following the implementation of the health reform 
as compared with the years marked by the absence of the healthcare reform. The signs, 
magnitudes, and significance levels of the coefficients are stable between different 
specifications.  
Figures 5 and 6 depict the yearly variations in divorce and marriage, respectively. 
The divorce patterns in Figure 5, as well as the marriage patterns in Figure 6, are similar 
for Massachusetts and New Jersey before 2006. However, the divorce and marriage 
patterns for Massachusetts changed significantly after 2006 relative to those of New 
Jersey. Figure 6 shows that Massachusetts’s divorce rate is generally higher than New 
Jersey’s, but the difference between the two states decreased significantly after 2006. 
Similarly, Figure 6 shows that Massachusetts’s marriage rate is generally lower than New 
Jersey’s, but that this rate increased in Massachusetts after 2006. Figures 5 and 6 suggest 
that the healthcare reform is not a one-time effect that occurred only in 2006, but a 
permanent effect on marriage behavior after 2006. 
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As the model part suggests, the results presented in the chapter suggest that residents 
in Massachusetts who have additional access to health insurance coverage in the health 
insurance exchanges market are more likely to get and stay married, because of the 
various prices of health insurance coverage on the ESI market and on the health insurance 
exchange market. For most people, Medicare is nearly free or low-cost as long as they or 
their spouses pay Medicare taxes while they are employed. Thus, the results in the first 
section suggest that individuals are more likely to leave marriage when qualifying for 
Medicare at age 65, when health insurance coverage becomes cheap. In contrast, unlike 
Medicare, the health insurance plans in the exchange market may be still expensive for 
many individuals. In addition, the 2006 Massachusetts Health Care Reform provides not 
only additional access to health insurance coverage in the exchange market but also 
pressure in the form of the individual mandate, which requires nearly all residents to 
purchase health insurance coverage if they meet minimum standards or to pay a hefty tax 
fine if affordable coverage is available to them and they do not enroll.6 In that case, to 
avoid paying penalties or paying high premiums on the exchange or in the non-group 
market, individuals are more likely to get or stay married to obtain coverage from 
spouses. 
6 The tax penalties for being uninsured as of 2011 are as follows: The tax penalty for individuals between 
the ages of 18 and 26 with incomes above $32,496 who do not have health insurance is $72 per month. 
For people 27 or older with incomes above $32,496, the penalty increases to $101 per month. Penalties 
are doubled for two parent families, in which both are uninsured. Individuals with incomes of less than 
$16,248 per year and families with incomes of less than $33,084 (based on a family of four) are exempt 
from the tax penalty. 
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In conclusion, health insurance coverage may serve as a marriage lock, whereas the 
price of health insurance is the key to this lock. When there are free or cheap health 
insurance plans available, such as Medicare, couples can escape from marriage; in 
contrast, when an individual mandate requires nearly everyone to purchase health 
insurance coverage and the health exchange market can only provide people with 
relatively expensive health insurance plans, people may lock themselves into marriage to 
get covered by spousal health insurance. 
Another possibility for improving marriage incentives under the healthcare reform 
may be explained by a recent report released by the Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment.7 This broad research program is expected to yield insights into the effects of 
expanding public health insurance. This study indicates that enrollment in Medicaid 
substantially increases the use of healthcare services, lowers rates of depression, reduces 
financial strain, and improves self-reported health and well-being. Thus, people under the 
healthcare reform have increased incentives for marriage, probably because health 
insurance coverage can make them feel happier, less stressed, and more optimistic about 
their health status; furthermore, health insurance coverage may also provide them a sense 
of security from financial hardship, as suggested by the Oregon study. For all these 
reasons, expanding health insurance coverage can increase the incentives for marriage. 
7 The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, an outgrowth of Oregon's 2008 lottery to allocate Medicaid 
slots to eligible residents, released its second year of results in May 2013. Evidence using the randomized 
controlled design showed that Medicaid coverage generated no statistically significant improvements in 
measured physical health outcomes in the first two years, but did generate increased healthcare use, higher 
rates of diabetes detection and management, lower rates of depression, and lower financial strain. 
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Connecticut Added to Control Group 
The estimation results for adding Connecticut to the control group in Specifications 
3 and 5 in Tables 7 and 8 are somewhat similar. Specification 3 reports the regular OLS 
estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and Specification 5 
reports the two-step estimates. Similar to the results in the other specifications, the 
coefficients on the interaction between Massachusetts residency and the availability of 
the Connector exchange market since 2006 are positive for marriage rates and negative 
for divorce rates, both of which are statistically significant under the one-step OLS 
estimation. However, the two-step estimate for the divorce estimation in Speciation 5 of 
Table 6 is no longer significant. The coefficient estimates imply that the probability of 
marriage increased approximately 1.2% and that the probability of divorce decreased 
approximately 0.4% in Massachusetts since the operation of the health exchange market 
started in 2006. 
 Triple-Difference Estimates 
I also focus primarily on various effects of the 2006 Massachusetts Health Care 
Reform on different income and age groups. I use triple difference methods for these 
subgroups estimations. 
Table 9 reports the main effects for three income groups: below 150% of the FPL, 
150% to 300% of the FPL, and above 300% of the FPL. Specification 1 reports regular 
OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the state level, and Specification 2 
controls for the state-specific time trend. In addition, the two-step estimates that adjust 
for standard errors are reported in Specification 3. The estimates in Table 9a show that 
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the effects of the healthcare reform on divorce are pronounced mostly for individuals 
between 150% and 300% of the FPL with relatively low income who are not eligible for 
Medicare. Individuals between 150% and 300% of the FPL are approximately 1.4% less 
likely to be divorced in the years following the implementation of the healthcare reform 
in Massachusetts as previously. In contrast, individuals in the groups of that make under 
150% of the FPL and those that make above 300% of FPL are not significantly affected 
in their divorce decisions by the healthcare reform.  
In Table 9b, I find that the most pronounced effect of the healthcare reform on 
marriage is still for individuals in the category of 150-300% of the FPL, that is, people 
with relatively low income who are not eligible for Medicaid or free health care under the 
reform. Those individuals are approximately 2.7% more likely to be married in the years 
following the implementation of the healthcare reform in Massachusetts than prior. 
However, people who are under 150% of FPL or above 300% of FPL are not 
significantly affected in their marriage decisions by the healthcare reform. 
In addition, by including the dummies for all age groups using the triple difference 
methods, I capture the effects of the changes in marriage behavior for different age 
groups associated with the healthcare reform. Table 10 shows the possible effects of the 
Connector on divorce among four age groups: 20 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, and 50 to 64. 
Specification 1 reports regular OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the 
state level and Specification 2 controls for the state-specific time trend. In addition, the 
two-step estimates to adjust for standard errors are reported in Specification 3. In Table 
10a, the 2006 healthcare reform seems to have the greatest and most significant effect on 
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divorce rates for individuals aged 50 to 64, estimated as an approximate 0.6% reduction 
in the probability of divorce. The largest effect found on the age group from 50 to 64 may 
be because those individuals have a greater demand for health insurance than young 
people, although they are not yet eligible for Medicare. Thus, they react more strongly 
than other age groups to the healthcare reform. It may also be explained in part by 
reviewing the results found in the first chapter on Medicare. That is, as they approach the 
age of Medicare eligibility, people become more reluctant to divorce and are more likely 
to stay married until age 65. 
In Table 10b, I find that the health exchanges have a large and significant effect on 
marriage rate for people aged 50 -64, as well as for people aged 20–29. Estimates show 
that individuals aged 50 to 64 are 1.5% more likely to be married after the 2006 health 
care reform, while young adults aged 20 to 29 are estimated to show a 1.8% increase in 
the probability of marriage. This is likely because those young adults are mostly likely to 
be uninsured before the healthcare reform, and are now seeking ways to obtain health 
insurance coverage under the individual mandate, that is, from their spouses after 
marriage. 
Elderly Population Estimates as a Placebo Test 
Lastly, I estimate a regression as a placebo test that only includes people aged 65 
and older in the sample, who already have access to Medicare health insurance coverage 
to test whether there are still significant changes in the divorce and marriage rates in 
Massachusetts after 2006. Tables 11a and 11b report estimates of divorce and marriage 
rates in Massachusetts compared with the control state, New Jersey, for people aged 65 
 
 
58 
 
and above. In Table 11a, the coefficient on the interaction between Massachusetts 
residency and the availability of the Connector exchange market since 2006 is negative 
for divorce rates; however, it is not statistically significant. Thus, there is no significant 
change in the divorce rate in Massachusetts compared with the control state for those 
aged 65 and above. The estimates in Table 11b report that Massachusetts residents aged 
65 and older are approximately 0.7% more likely to be married in the years following the 
implementation of the healthcare reform than prior. However, the two-step estimate in 
Specification 3 is not significant either. Generally speaking, the large reduction in 
magnitude and statistical significance level suggest that health insurance exchanges 
probably have very little effect on marriage behavior for people who already have 
Medicare health insurance coverage. 
Conclusion 
In the second chapter, I have focused on changes in marriage behavior following the 
rollout of the exchange market under the Massachusetts healthcare reform. I find that the 
Connector operation in Massachusetts reduces divorce rates by approximately 0.5% and 
increases marriage rates by approximately 1.4%. The effects are most pronounced for 
individuals living at between 150-300% of the FPL, who have access to the health 
insurance exchange. These estimates, although small because of the large samples used,  
are precisely estimated to be different from zero. 
My estimates from the two chapters provide evidence that marriage lock exists. 
These estimates further suggest that health insurance coverage is an underlying cause of 
marriage lock, and that the price of health insurance coverage could be the key. When 
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there are cheap or almost free health insurance plans available, such as Medicare, couples 
may be more likely to escape from marriage. In contrast, the insurance plans offered on 
the health exchange market are still relatively expensive, even though government 
subsidies make them more affordable. Therefore, individuals may have an increased 
incentive to get married in order to obtain coverage from spousal health insurance under 
the current healthcare reform. This is the converse side of job lock — remaining or 
becoming married so as to be eligible for employer-sponsored (subsidized) health 
insurance. 
Discussion 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) stipulates that individuals are able to purchase 
insurance from insurance exchanges. Insurers are not allowed to exclude coverage based 
on pre-existing conditions or to price premiums on the basis of health status. These 
features of the ACA may encourage marriage flexibility by providing potential divorcees 
with a health insurance option should they leave their current marriage. However, a 
disparity between the value of health coverage through the exchanges and the value of 
coverage through some existing employer plans is likely to persist for some time (Eibner 
et al., 2010). Thus, the empirical research in the second section demonstrates a significant 
increase in the marriage rate and a significant reduction in the divorce rate under the 2006 
Massachusetts health care reforms, suggesting that the incentives for marriage have 
improved in the United States as a result of the current implementation of healthcare 
reform. 
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However, the value of insurance provided through the exchanges will be influenced 
by the method in which states choose to structure them. The ACA will be phased in over 
the next few years with a high-risk pool for purchasing insurance, and ultimately, all 
individuals will have access to insurance exchanges in 2014. With the deepening of the 
healthcare reform, health insurance will become increasingly affordable. In July 2013, 
New York State insurance regulators indicated that individuals buying health insurance 
on their own would see their premiums drop the next year in New York as the changes 
under the federal healthcare law take effect. In addition, they have approved rates for 
2014 that are at least 50% lower on average than those currently available in New York. 
The extraordinary decline in New York’s insurance rates for individual consumers 
demonstrates the potentially profound future impact of the health care reform, in the form 
of universal coverage, more affordable individual health insurance, and the removal of 
the marriage lock. 
Investigating the impact of these changes on health insurance markets and marriage 
behavior under healthcare reform will be an interesting area for future research. For 
instance, it will be important to examine whether marriage lock disappears when 
insurance prices in the exchange markets are low enough and whether equilibrium exists, 
for example, when the price in the exchange market equals the price people pay for ESI 
coverage. 
In summary, in the future, we will see more states like Massachusetts and New York  
setting up exchanges under the ACA—where competition and transparency in the 
exchange marketplaces are leading to more affordable health insurance coverage and 
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marriage lock is likely to eventually disappear as the price in the individual health 
insurance market decreases. The effect of health insurance coverage on marriage 
behavior is a problem that deserves our full attention, especially under the current 
healthcare reform. Hopefully, this paper paves the road for more sophisticated empirical 
studies in the future. 
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Table 7: Difference in Difference Estimates of Divorce Rates under the 2006 
Massachusetts Health Care Reform 
Whether the Individual is Divorced OLS Two-Step Estimator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment Group (MA Residency) .0104** .0102** .0104*** .0104*** .0036 
 (.0004) (.0003) (.0019) (.0025) (.0029) 
Post Year (Year >-2006) .0023*** .1045** .0925** .0046*** .0037* 
 (.0001) (.0041) (.0036) (.0013) (.0018) 
Treatment Group* Post Year -.0039** -.0069** -.0042*** -.0046** -.0037 
 (MA Residency) * (Year>=2006) 
  
(.0002) (.0003) (.0027) (.0019) (.0040) 
Personal Income 6.64e-08*** .6.46e-08*** 5.78e-08*** 4.66e-07*** 4.77e-
08***  (9.19e-10) (9.43e-10) (4.98e-09) (5.91e-09) (4.97e-09) 
Education Level -.0037* -.0037* -.0039*** -.0029*** -.0039*** 
 (.0006) (.0006) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001) 
Gender .0290** .0290* .0289*** .0440*** .0305*** 
 (.0009) (.0009) (.0006) (.0007) (.0006) 
Race 
 
 
.0042*** .0010 -.0011*** .0042*** .0008*** 
 
 
(.0002) (.0004) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Disability .0045 .1944** .0136*** .0045*** .0108*** 
 (.0014) (.0069) (.0013) (.0014) (.0013) 
Employment -.0250 -.0220 .0236*** -.0250*** .0276*** 
 (.0008) (.0052) (.0007) (.0008) (.0007) 
Employer Sponsored Health Insurance -.0836*** -.0061*** -.0064*** -.0836*** -.0248*** 
 (.0014) (.0006) (.0010) (.0015) (.0011) 
Citizenship -.0252*** -.0059 -.0074*** -.0252*** -.0050*** 
 (.0012) (.0022) (.0010) (.0011) (.0010) 
Number of Children -.0673*** -.0097*** -.0095*** -.0673*** -.0086*** 
 (.0003) (.0001) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) 
Age .0062*** .0047** .0047*** .0062*** .0049*** 
 (.0001) (.0003) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trend No Yes Yes No No 
Connecticut Added to Control Group No No Yes No Yes 
Note: Source: ACS 2001-2011. N=760,156. Age Range: 20 - 64. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust, clustered by state and are shown in 
parentheses. The dependent variable in is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual is being divorced. 
For Specification for two-step estimator, the estimates for the first three key independent variables are reported 
from the second step, and all others estimates are reported from the first step. 
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Table 8: Difference in Difference Estimates of Marriage Rates under the 2006 
Massachusetts Health Care Reform 
Whether the Individual is Married OLS Two-Step Estimator 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment Group (MA Residency) -.0205*** -.0174*** .0184*** -.0215*** .0152** 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0011) (.0051) (.0032) 
Post Year (Year >-2006) -.0282*** -.2345** -.2336*** -.2170** -.0242*** 
 (.0004) (.0057) (.0025) (.0033) (.0031) 
Treatment Group* Post Year .0133** .0150** .0124*** .0145** .0124*** 
 (MA Residency) * (Year>=2006) 
  
(.0004) (.0006) (.0014) (.0069) (.0044) 
Personal Income 4.66e-07*** 4.66e-07*** 4.62e-07*** 4.66e-07*** 4.63e-07*** 
 (6.34e-09) (6.31e-09) (5.06e-09) (5.91e-09) (5.06e-09) 
Education Level .0029 .0029 .0032*** .0029*** .0032*** 
 .0008 (.0008) (.0002) (.0002) (.0001) 
Gender -.0440* -.0440* -.0431*** -.0440*** -.0431*** 
 (.0070) (.0070) (.0006) (.0007) (.0007) 
Race 
 
 
.0042* .0042* .0040*** .0042*** .0040*** 
 
 
(.0005) (.0005) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Disability -.0045 -.0045 -.0030** -.0045*** .0030** 
 (.0039) (.0039) (.0013) (.0014) (.0013) 
Employment .0250** .0250** .0254** .0250*** -.0253*** 
 (.0020) (.0021) (.0007) (.0008) (.0007) 
Employer Sponsored Health .0831* .0836* .0854*** .0836*** .0855*** 
Insurance (.0084) (.0084) (.0014) (.0015) (.0014) 
Citizenship .0251** .0252** .0267*** .0252*** .0264*** 
 (.0012) (.0018) (.0011) (.0012) (.0011) 
Number of Children .0673*** .0673*** .0668*** .0673*** .0667*** 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) 
Age .0062** .0062** .0062*** .0062*** .0070*** 
 (.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Time Trend No Yes Yes No No 
Connecticut Added to Control Group No No Yes No Yes 
Note: Source: ACS 2001-2011. N=760,156. Age Range: 20 - 64. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust, clustered by state and are shown in 
parentheses. The dependent variable in is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual is being married. 
For Specification for two-step estimator, the estimates for the first three key independent variables are reported 
from the second step, and all others estimates are reported from the first step. 
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Table 9: Estimates for Marriage Behavior by Income Groups under the 2006 
Massachusetts Health Care Reform 
9a: Main Effects of The Health Care Reform            OLS         Two-Step Estimator 
on Divorce (1) (2) (3) 
   Below 150% FPL -.0101** -.0134** -.0075 
 (.0043) (.0063) (.0084) 
   150 -300% FPL -.0091*** -.0147*** -.0136** 
 (.0036) (.0058) (.0081) 
   Above 300% FPL -.0029 -.0051 -.0029 
 (.0022) (.0052) (.0058) 
   Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
   State-Specific Time Trend No Yes No 
    
9b: Main Effects of The Health Care Reform           OLS         Two-Step Estimator 
on Marriage (1) (2) (3) 
   Below 150% FPL .0094* .0102 .0098 
 (.0068) (.0089) (.0105) 
   150 -300% FPL .0229*** .0234*** .0268** 
 (.0117) (.0135) (.0153) 
   Above 300% FPL .0067** .0084* .0073 
 (.0037) (.0063) (.0111) 
   Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
  State-Specific Time Trend No Yes No 
Note: Source: ACS 2001-2011. N=760,156. Age Range: 20 - 64. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust, clustered by state and are shown in 
parentheses. The dependent variable in divorce estimation is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual 
is being divorced, and the dependent variable in marriage estimation is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
individual is being married; the main independent variables includes Massachusetts residency dummy, post 2006 
dummy, income penalty group dummy and their interaction terms. The coefficients on interaction terms among 
Massachusetts residency dummy, post 2006 dummy, and income penalty group dummy are indicated on the row 
label as the main effects. All specifications include controls for age, income, education, gender, race, disability, 
years married, times married, number of children, health insurance coverage, and other interaction terms for triple 
difference estimation.  
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Table 10: Difference in Difference in Difference Estimates for Marriage 
Behavior by Age Groups under the 2006 Massachusetts Health Care Reform 
10a: Main Effects of The Health Care Reform  OLS Two-Step Estimator 
on Divorce (1) (2) (3) 
  Age 20 -29 -.0036* -.0059 -.0044 
 (.0006) (.0040) (.0027) 
  Age 30 -39 -.0028*** -.0062* -.0024 
 (.0001) (.0037) (.0016) 
  Age 40 -49 -.0016** -.0052 -.0016 
 (.0001) (.0035) (.0016) 
  Age 50-64 -.0053** -.0087*** -.0059** 
 (.0003) (.0033) (.0029) 
  Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
  State-Specific Time Trend No Yes No 
    
10b: Main Effects of The Health Care Reform   OLS Two-Step Estimator 
on Marriage (1) (2) (3) 
  Age 20 -29 .0178*** .0183*** .0180** 
 (.0035) (.0045) (.0096) 
  Age 30 -39 .0129*** .0135*** .0121 
 (.0031) (.0042) (.0088) 
  Age 40 -49 .0082*** .0090** .0068 
 (.0028) (.0040) (.0054) 
  Age 50-64 .0141*** .0146*** .0153** 
 (.0026) (.0039) (.0080) 
  Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
  State-Specific Time Trend No Yes No 
Note: Source: ACS 2001-2011. N=760,156. Age Range: 20 - 64. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust, clustered by state and are shown in 
parentheses. The dependent variable in divorce estimation is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual 
is being divorced, and the dependent variable in marriage estimation is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
individual is being married; the main independent variables includes Massachusetts residency dummy, post 
2006 dummy, income penalty group dummy and their interaction terms. The coefficients on interaction terms 
among Massachusetts residency dummy, post 2006 dummy, and age group dummy are indicated on the row 
label as the main effects. All specifications include controls for age, income, education, gender, race, disability, 
years married, times married, number of children, health insurance coverage, and other interaction terms for 
triple difference estimation.  
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Table 11: Difference in Difference Estimates of Marriage Behavior for People 
Aged 65 and Older between Massachusetts and New Jersey 
11a: Main Effects of The Health Care Reform  OLS Two-Step Estimator 
on Divorce (1) (2) (3) 
   Treatment Group (MA Residency) .0077*** .0080** .0078** 
 (.0016) (.0034) (.0024) 
   Post Year (>=2006) .0176*** .1061*** .0174* 
 (.0051) (.0039) (.0079) 
   Treatment Group* Post Year -.0008 -.0012 -.0010 
   (MA Residency) * (>=2006)   (.0022) (.0038) (.0039) 
   Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
   State-Specific Time Trend No Yes Yes 
    
11b: Main Effects of The Health Care Reform  OLS Two-Step Estimator 
on Marriage (1) (2) (3) 
   Treatment Group (MA Residency) -.0130*** -.0130*** -.0132** 
 (.0024) (.0034) (.0055) 
   Post Year (>=2006) -.3308*** -.3333*** -.3327*** 
 (.0127) (.0159) (.0197) 
   Treatment Group* Post Year .0071** .0072* .0070 
   (MA Residency) * (>=2006)   (.0026) (.0040) (.0044) 
   Year Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
   State-Specific Time Trend No Yes Yes 
Note: Source: ACS 2001-2011. N= 197,644. Age Range: 65 and up. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% respectively. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust, clustered by state and are shown in parentheses. 
The dependent variable in divorce estimation is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual is being divorced, 
and the dependent variable in marriage estimation is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual is being 
married. All specifications include controls for age, income, education, gender, race, disability, years married, times 
married, number of children, and health insurance coverage.  
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Figure 4: Divorce Rates and Marriage Rates for Massachusetts, New Jersey and 
Connecticut 
 
Note: Divorce rate is defined as the number of individuals being divorced per 1000 
population in Figure 6a, and marriage rate is defined as the number of individuals being 
married per 1000 population in Figure 6b. Individuals in the sample range in age from 20 to 
64. Data source is American Community Survey (ACS) 2001-2011 and N=934,945. 
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Figure 5: First Step State-Year Coefficients for Divorce Estimation between 
Massachusetts and New Jersey 
 
Note: Data source is American Community Survey (ACS) 2001-2011, and 
individuals in the sample are between ages 20 and 64. The treatment state is 
Massachusetts, and the control state is New Jersey. The “Mean State Effects by 
Year” are the estimates for the coefficient of the interaction terms between state 
and year from the first step derived by using the two-step estimation method. 
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Figure 6: First Step State-Year Coefficients for Marriage Estimation between 
Massachusetts and New Jersey 
 
Note: Data source is American Community Survey (ACS) 2001-2011, and 
individuals in the sample are between aged 20 and 64. The treatment state is 
Massachusetts, and the control state is New Jersey. The “Mean State Effects by 
Year” are the estimates for the coefficient of the interaction terms between state 
and year from the first step derived by using the two-step estimation method. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 Introduction 
In times of increasing health care expenditure, exploring alternative methods of 
health care financing becomes increasingly attractive. By forcing patients to be 
responsible for their own medical expenditures, Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) may 
be an appealing health financing alternative (Prescott, 1998 and Schieber, 1997). 
Accumulated through mandatory savings, MSAs are used to contain medical 
expenditures through demand side incentives. Advocates of MSAs suggest that MSAs 
could reduce moral hazard, increase choice, improve efficiency of insurance, and result in 
lower costs and expenditures on health care. (Anna Dixon, 2002).  
Policy makers expect MSAs to contain health care costs and serve as an efficient 
cost savings instrument. However, whether MSAs can help achieve these goals depends 
on how enrollees view money in their MSAs. If enrollees treat MSA money as cheap 
money, the purported function of MSAs as instruments for controlling medical demand 
and of saving would be questionable. Although MSAs have become a widely proposed 
model for financing health care, few empirical studies or evaluations of MSAs have been 
conducted. 
In this chapter, I use data from the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) to 
explore three decisions potentially affected by the implementation of MSAs. First, I 
examine how MSAs affect out-of-pocket spending on medical care. I find that individuals 
with MSAs incur 17 RMB more medical expenses per 1000 RMB increase in their MSAs 
balance, while I find no significant effect of after-tax income on medical expenses. This 
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result is robust to adding covariates, and instrumenting for the MSA balance using the 
housing account balance. Second, I study whether and how preference heterogeneity will 
influence medical spending in the presence of the Chinese MSA scheme as revealed by 
three types of risky (or risk-reducing) behaviors. The three risky (or risk reducing) 
behaviors are wearing seat belts, obeying traffic signals and investing in risky projects. I 
find that undertaking risky investments is associated with 23% more medical 
expenditures; while always using seat-belt and obeying traffic signals are associated with 
16% and 22% higher medical expenditures, respectively. Finally, I find evidence 
suggesting that individuals become more risk averse with MSAs than without, 
specifically by increasing their use of seat belts and obeying traffic signals.  
These findings using recent Chinese data suggest that MSAs play an important role 
when consumers are empowered to make health expenditure decisions, and that 
preferences involving risk and prevention also appear to be influenced by the new MSAs 
scheme. The insights which the case study in China provides on how enrollees spend 
money out of their MSAs afford a perspective on the role of MSAs in health insurance 
markets. The results should be of interest to policy makers, suggesting that they exercise 
caution in using MSAs as an instrument to contain medical expenditures, and providing 
insights into how to incorporate MSAs into health insurance policy and to improve MSAs 
performance.  
Medical Saving Accounts in China 
Singapore finances its national health care with a very low input of gross domestic 
product (GDP), which is mostly attributed to their medical savings accounts schemes. 
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Inspired by Singapore’s success, the Chinese government since 1990s has adopted the 
Singaporean MSAs model as its health care financing scheme for urban areas. By the end 
of 1998, a nationwide reform campaign to promote Medical Saving Accounts was carried 
out, which makes China the second nation to adopt MSAs as a major tool for financing 
health care.  
While there are certain minor variations in policy design across different regions, the 
national health care reforms have common key features stipulated by government 
guidelines. Ensuring access to basic care, the insurance policy in China features 
individual medical savings accounts (MSAs) and a social risk pooling fund (SRP) 
financed by joint contributions from employers and employees (Gordon G. Liu et al., 
2002).  
The general structure of MSAs in China is illustrated in Figure 7. As shown in the 
figure, the employer and the employee jointly deposit a fixed percentage (3.8%) of the 
employee’s wage into the employee’s personal MSA. In addition, 4.2% of the wage goes 
into a Social Risk Pool Fund (SRP), which is used to cover large medical expenses 
including inpatient hospital costs. The SRP has a payment limit for each consumer, which 
is four times the average wage of workers in that city. Any expense exceeding this ceiling 
must be covered by the enrollee’s out-of-pocket payments or supplementary insurance.  
With regard to MSAs in China, there are several noteworthy features. Contributions 
to an MSA by an employee are mandatory and directly withheld from his/her earnings. 
The money in the MSA earns the same interest as the saving interest in banks, but is 
restricted to payment for his/her own medical expenditures. Unlike in Singapore, MSA 
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funds in China may not be used to pay for medical expenditures by other household 
members or for the enrollee’s own consumption other than health care. In principle, the 
MSA money cannot be cashed out, although money in an MSA can be given as an 
inheritance or a gift to the enrollee’s household members or friends. 
In a typical social insurance scheme, enrollees are expected to pay all of their 
outpatient medical expenses out of the MSAs until the funds have been depleted. MSA 
funds unspent at the end of the year will be carried over to the following year. When the 
MSA is exhausted, enrollees have to pay outpatient expenses out-of-pocket. When an 
enrollee incurs large medical expenses such as inpatient hospital expenses, he/she has to 
first pay a deductible that equals 10% of the annual wage. Expenses exceeding this 
deductible will be paid by the SRP, but the patient needs to pay coinsurance, the rate of 
which will be decided by the local governments. Expenses exceeding this ceiling can be 
covered by supplementary insurance schemes, or must be paid by the patient out-of-
pocket.  
Literature Review 
Medical saving accounts are widely adopted in China, and also discussed in 
different countries’ proposal for health care reform around the world. On the one hand, 
the proposals to adopt MSAs have received a great deal of public support. MSAs 
advocates suggest that the accounts can improve the efficiency of insurance, increase 
consumer choice, and reduce health care expenditures (Buttler 1999; Goodman & 
Musgrave 1992; Pauly & Goodman 1995; Ramsay 1998). But these goals would be 
undermined if enrollees do not value the money in their medical saving accounts. There 
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is little empirical evidence on their impact. On the other hand, there are criticisms and 
debates about the possible negative impacts from implementing MSAs. Critics of MSAs 
argue that the accounts could lead to adverse selection, reduce equity, result in cost 
inflation, and deter necessary utilization (Moon, Nichols, & Walls 1997; Manitoba Centre 
for Health Policy 2000). Barr (2001) finds no evidence that MSAs have been effective in 
restraining health costs from Singapore’s experiences. 
Deber et al. (2004) suggest that different MSAs rules could lead to different 
incentives. Empirical studies on MSAs coupled with high deductible plans in the USA 
suggest that people treat payments with MSAs as less costly than payments with out-of-
pocket money, due to the fact that contributions to MSAs are tax deductible. However, 
the case could be different in China, since the saving in a MSA is mandatory as a fixed 
percentage of the employee’s income. In addition, marginal income taxes in China are 
low, so the tax deductibility advantage may be small. If Chinese consumers pay little 
attention to income tax benefits, then tax deductibility alone will not make enrollees in 
China value funds in MSAs as highly as in the U.S. In the empirical estimation section, I 
compare the balance in the MSAs with after-tax income to rule out the possible tax 
factor. 
In addition to the literature on Medical Saving Accounts, several studies have 
focused on whether heterogeneity in risk preferences could generate different results 
concerning risk selection. On the one hand, a traditional model assuming that all 
consumers are equally risk averse would predict that risk-loving individuals should be 
more likely than others to purchase insurance because they face a greater risk, and this 
 
 
75 
 
positive correlation between risk and insurance coverage is usually called “adverse 
selection.” On the other hand, more and more studies have found a negative correlation 
between risk and insurance coverage on advantageous selection. Hemenway (1990, 1992) 
documents that the standard adverse selection prediction can be reversed if individuals 
who are highly risk avoiding are both more likely to purchase insurance and more likely 
to take efforts to reduce the risk of experiencing a loss. De Meza and Webb (2001) show 
that advantageous selection can be generated with heterogeneity in risk aversion under 
imperfect competition. Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (2007) suggest that advantageous 
selection requires private risk-aversion and a non-competitive insurance market. 
Several recent empirical studies have provided evidence of the importance of 
preference in various insurance markets. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) find that 
consumers could purchase insurance for reasons related to preferences, and individuals 
with long-term health care insurance are more likely to engage in preventive behaviors, 
such as immunizations and cancer screening. By analyzing several types of insurance 
markets, Cutler et al. (2008) find that individuals who engage in what are commonly 
thought of as risky behaviors (smoking, drinking, or prior employment in jobs with 
higher mortality rates) or who do not take measures to reduce risk (preventive health 
activities or wearing a seat belt) are systematically less likely to hold each of these 
insurance products. Especially, they find that individuals who engage in preventive health 
behaviors are more likely to carry insurance but less likely to have claims. Fang et al. 
(2008) show that advantageous selection exists in the Medigap market and suggest that it 
could be driven by multiple factors, such as income and cognitive ability. Buchmueller et 
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al. (2013) study the market for private health insurance in Australia and find no evidence 
for the positive correlation between risk and the level of insurance coverage. These 
studies document the advantageous selection observed in various health insurance 
markets, and suggest that advantageous selection could be driven by the effect of risk 
aversion, cognitive ability and income. In this chapter, since enrollees do not have a 
choice to decide how much insurance coverage they would like to have under the MSAs 
system in China, I will only focus on studying the association between risky behavior and 
risk occurrence in the health insurance market. 
In this third chapter, I examine the relation between risky behaviors and medical 
expenditures in health insurance markets in China under the scheme of Medical Saving 
Accounts. The analysis is highly complementary to the studies of preference 
heterogeneity on insurance markets discussed above. 
Data 
The analysis uses individual-level data from the China Household Finance Survey 
(CHFS), which is a nationally representative survey in China that has detailed 
information about housing, business assets, financial assets, and other household assets. 
In addition, the survey has information on income, expenditure and social and 
commercial health insurance. The China Household Finance Survey is carried out by the 
Survey and Research Center for China Household Finance, which is a non-profit 
institution for academic inquiry founded by the Southwestern University of Finance and 
Economics. I use the first wave of the survey conducted in the summer of 2011.  
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The sample size is 29,324 individuals and 8,438 households. Table 12 presents key 
summary statistics for the sample. The variables include monthly medical expenditure, 
monthly income, health insurance, medical saving account, measures of risky (or risk 
reducing) behaviors, self-reported health status and other demographic variables. To 
examine how measures of risk tolerance are related to medical expenditures, I proxy for 
risk tolerance using three measures of risky (or risk-reducing) behavior that are likely to 
capture individual risk aversion: (1) use of a seatbelt; (2) obeying traffic signals; and (3) 
investment attitude toward risky projects. To gauge the investment attitude towards risky 
projects, the respondents are asked to make a hypothetical choice of investments among 
five different risk levels. The risk attitude toward investment is a categorical variable that 
takes a value from 1 to 5 to indicate the increasing level of risk and return of the 
investment. The dependent variable is monthly out-of-pocket medical expenditure, which 
is defined as the total medical expenditure minus the part covered by private health 
insurance plans8. This cost of medical services is the cost consumers really care about 
and need to pay from either their MSAs or after-tax income. As shown in Table 12, on 
average, 30% of those surveyed drive cars (and 60% of these drivers report always 
wearing a seat belt), 80% report always obeying a traffic signal, 41% of people choose to 
take no risk in investment, and 7% elect to invest in the riskiest projects.  
 
8 Private health insurance plans are not common in China. Only 476 individuals have private health 
insurance plans in the sample. 
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Method 
I first estimate the following equation to study how MSAs affect out of pocket 
spending on medical care. 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀                                   (3. 1) 
where out of pocket (OOP) medical expense is the cost of the medical services that 
consumers need to pay from either their MSAs or after-tax income. MSAbalance is the 
balance in the individual’s MSAs, and X is a set of control variables, which include the 
individual’s after tax income, self-reported health status, and other demographic 
variables. 
For the second topic, I study whether preference heterogeneity also influences 
medical spending in the presence of the Chinese MSA scheme as revealed by measures of 
risk tolerance. I proxy for risk tolerance using three measures of behaviors that likely 
capture individual risk aversion: use of seat belts, obeying traffic signals and investment 
attitude toward risky projects.  
I estimate the following equation to examine the relationship between risk behavior 
and medical expenses. 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀                                          (3. 2) 
where out-of-pocket (OOP) medical expense is the cost of the medical services that 
consumers need to pay from either their MSAs or after-tax income. Behavior as a 
measure of risk tolerance refers to one of the three risky (or risk-reducing) behaviors, and 
X represents covariates, which include the individual’s after tax income, self-reported 
health status and other demographic variables.  
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In the sample, about 40% of the individuals do not have MSAs, probably because 
their employers did not set up MSAs for them9, they are unemployed or they are residents 
of rural areas. To investigate whether MSAs affect medical expenditures for these 
heterogeneous individuals in the market, I employ the following difference-in-difference 
(DID) method:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽4(𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀)𝑀𝑀                                                  +𝛽𝛽5𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀                                                                                (3.3) 
Where out-of-pocket (OOP) medical expense is the cost of the medical services that 
consumers need to pay from either their MSAs or after-tax income. Behavior as a 
measure of risk tolerance refers to one of the three risky (or risk-reducing) behaviors. 
MSAs is a dummy variable used to identify whether individuals have MSAs or not. The 
interaction term for risky behavior and MSAs is the key independent variable in the DID 
estimation. And X represents covariates, which include an individual’s after tax income, 
self-reported health status and other demographic variables. 
Last, I use a moral hazard test to examine whether the existence of MSAs changes 
people’s risky behavior or not. Empirically, I regress the risky behaviors on the MSA 
dummy as in the following estimation: 
𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀                                                                            (3.4) 
Where the dependent variable Behavior refers to one of the risky (or risk reducing) 
behaviors. MSAs is a dummy variable that identifies whether individuals have MSAs or 
9 The Chinese Government has started to extend Medical Saving Accounts to all urban employers, 
including the self-employed and private business owners, in some pilot urban areas since 2007. 
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not, and X represents covariates, which include the individual’s after tax income, self-
reported health status, employment, educational level, and other demographic variables. 
Results 
Medical Expenditure under the Scheme of MSAs 
For individuals possessing MSAs, they will first use the balance in their MSAs to 
pay for medical services, before using their own pocket money, which is after-tax income 
in this analysis. In other words, the MSAs balance and pocket money are analogous to 
two pockets. Ideally, enrollees will value their assets in the MSAs the same as their 
pocket money when paying for medical services, and thus MSAs could efficiently 
contain health costs by forcing patients to be responsible for their own expenditures. I 
first examine how MSAs affect out-of-pocket spending on medical care when controlling 
after-tax income. Table 13 reports results from the OLS regression (Equation 3.1) for 
individuals with MSAs. 
The dependent variable is the out-of-pocket medical expenditure that consumers 
really care about, and need to pay from their savings in MSAs or pocket money (unit: 
RMB). The key independent variable is the balance in the MSAs. In addition, I control 
for after-tax income, self-reported health status, gender, age, marriage status, educational 
levels and ethnicity in the regressions. The self-reported health status is a categorical 
variable that takes a value from 1 to 5 to indicate the self-reported physical condition 
compared with peers, where a very good condition is given a value of 1 and a very poor 
condition a value of 5.  
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Table 13 shows that every 1000 RMB saved in Medical Saving Accounts is 
associated with about 17 RMB more out-of-pocket medical expenditure. Since the MSA 
balance is closely correlated with income, and individuals will first use their money in the 
MSAs to pay for health care costs, the coefficient of MSA balance attracts most of the 
positive effect from after-tax income on the out-of-pocket medical expenditures. Thus, 
the coefficient in front of the after-tax income is negative, though very small and not 
significant. For individuals with high income, the high balances in their MSAs could 
prove to be too large for them to spend on medical expenditures after considering future 
health care risk. If so, those high-income individuals may tend to spend more out of their 
medical saving accounts, as their MSA balances keep increasing every month. However, 
many other enrollees could become more myopic in medical consumption and think they 
are getting richer in terms of resources for health care spending with the existence of 
compulsory saving for MSAs. Because of the “income effect” of the increasing available 
funds in MSAs, these individuals tend to spend more on medical care immediately, 
although the MSAs are designed to help them save money exclusively for their future 
medical expenses. Thus, the MSAs probably have a nonlinear effect on out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures. To address non-linearity, I perform the Ramsey RESET test using 
powers of the fitted values of out-of-pocket medical expenditure to test whether the 
model has no omitted variables. The F test10 shows that I could not reject the null 
hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables. 
10  In the Ramsey RESET test, the F-test statisitiscs is F(3, 1836) =26.73 and Prob > F = 0.0000. 
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In Specification 2, I add self-reported health status to the regression. Health is an 
endogenous variable, because there could be some unobservable health characteristics 
( not reflected in the self-reported health status) that could affects the individual’s out-of-
pocket medical expenditures and medical saving account balance. For example, an 
individual may be very optimistic by nature, or he/she does not presently have any 
chronic illness, so that individual would report a very good health status. However, there 
may be some unobservable health characteristics that over time could lead to some 
serious acute illness, which would be associated with a substantial out-of-pocket medical 
expenditure or draw-down of much of the MSA balance. Due to the extremely close 
correlation between the self-reported health status and the out-of-pocket expenditures, as 
well as the limits of the data sample, I could not find an appropriate instrumental variable 
for the health status variable. However, the estimate for the key variable remains 
significant and robust, even if I do not include health status as a control variable. 
In Specification 3, I also control for consumption attitude and the personal care 
expenditure. The consumption attitude is a categorical variable that takes a value from 1 
to 5, and indicates how much more the individual is willing to spend when the value of 
his/her assets rises, where a value 1 is given to “very willing” and a value of 5 to “very 
unwilling.” The estimates show that individuals who are very willing to spend tend to 
have more medical expenditures when they have MSAs. In Specification 4, I control for 
personal care expenditure, which is individual spending on personal care that is not 
covered by insurance, e.g.,dietary supplements and massage. The estimates suggest that 
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as individuals spend more on personal care, such as dietary supplements and massage, to 
improve their health, they have lower out-of-pocket medical expenditures.  
In addition to self-reported health status, the key variable “MSAs balance” and the 
control variable ”after-tax income” are probably endogenous variables as well. There 
could be unobservable health characteristics that could cause individuals to develop some 
serious acute illness, which would be reflected in the MSA balance and out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures. Moreover, serious illness could affect the individual’s income, 
e.g.,losing the ability to work or increased absenteeism due to illness. I find two IVs for 
these two endogenous variables, which are the balance in the housing saving accounts 
and the amount of tax the individual paid. Similar to the medical saving accounts, 
housing saving accounts are also compulsory savings from a fixed percentage of the 
employee’s monthly salary to pay for the individual’s housing needs.11 Thus, the balance 
of the housing saving accounts is correlated with the medical saving accounts, while 
uncorrelated with the out of pocket medical expenditures. And I choose tax as an 
instrument variable for income since tax is correlated with income while it is uncorrelated 
with out-of-pocket medical expenditures. The IV regression results in Specification 5 and 
6 suggest that the estimates for the key variable are robust. Standard errors (shown in 
parentheses) are robust and clustered at the province level for all specifications. 
11 In 2011, both employers and employees jointly contribute 7% of the employee’s monthly salary to the 
employee’s housing saving account in Shanghai. 
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Risky Behavior and Medical Expenses 
The next test examines how measures of risk tolerance are related to medical 
expenses, and to whether the individual has an MSA. Table 14 examines the relationship 
between risky behavior and medical expenses by estimating equation (3.2) above. As 
suggested by Cutler et al. (2008), I examine the simple and unconditional relationship 
between risky behaviors and risk occurrence, as well as the relationship when controlling 
for covariates (X). 
In Table 14, the first row in each risky behavior panel gives the coefficient on that 
risky (or risk-reducing) behavior variable. The first two panel rows examine the 
relationship between risk-reducing behaviors, i.e., use of seatbelt and always obeying 
traffic signals, and the occurrence of risk, i.e., out-of-pocket medical expenditures. Given 
that the average out-of-pocket medical expenditure is 216.68 RMB in the sample, I find 
that always using a seat belt is associated with a 16% higher medical expenditure and 
obeying traffic signals is associated with a 22% higher medical expenditure. The third 
panel row shows the relationship between investment in risky projects and out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures, where investment in risky projects is a categorical variable that 
takes a value from 1 to 5 to indicate the increasing level of risk and return on investment 
that the individual chooses to take. The estimates show that undertaking risky 
investments is associated with a 23% increase in medical expenditures. Additional 
controls include demographic variables such as self-reported health status, age, income, 
education, marriage status, and gender. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust 
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and are shown in parentheses for all specifications, and clustered by province for 
Specifications 2 and 4.  
In sum, the results are mixed; risk loving individuals who would choose to invest in 
the riskiest projects tend to have more medical expenditures than individuals who avoid 
risk in investment, while risk averse individuals who always wear a seat belt or always 
obey traffic signals tend to have more medical expenditures than individuals who do not 
have these two risk-reducing behaviors. These findings suggest that preference 
heterogeneity also influences medical spending in the presence of the Chinese MSA 
scheme as revealed by three types of risky behaviors. 
In addition, in apparent contradiction to my results, Cutler et al. (2008) find that 
individuals who always wear a seat belt will have less medical expenditures in the 
Medigap market than individuals who do not use seat belts. However, my estimates 
suggest that individuals who always wear a seat belt tend to have 16% higher medical 
expenditures covered by insurance with MSAs. A likely explanation is that risk averse 
individuals who always wear a seat belt probably use more preventive health services 
with their MSAs.  
These risk averse individuals might use more preventive and primary health care 
(i.e., non-prescription drugs and out-patient hospital services), available through MSAs 
— as a possible explanation for their higher medical expenses. Thus, I next use the DID 
approach to investigate whether MSAs affect the medical expenditure for these 
heterogeneous individuals. Table 15 reports the DID estimate of the relationship between 
risky behaviors and medical expenditures for individuals with MSAs (60% in the 
 
 
86 
 
sample). The first row in each risky behavior panel gives the coefficient on the 
interaction term between the dummy variable for individuals holding MSAs and the risky 
behavior variable in the panel. The results show that for all three risky (or risk-reducing) 
behaviors, individuals with MSAs are associated with higher medical expenditures than 
individuals who do not have MSAs, after controlling for variables such as self-reported 
health status measures, age, income, education, marriage status, and gender. 
Risky Behavior and Medical Saving Accounts 
To find out whether MSAs change people’s risky behavior, I test for moral hazard 
by estimating Equation (3.4) above. Table 16 reports the regression results for the moral 
hazard test. I regress risky behavior variables on the dummy of having MSAs, as well as 
a set of control variables. Although whether to have an MSA is not a choice for 
consumers in China, individuals with MSAs and those without MSAs could be quite 
different in terms of a number of characteristics (e.g., income level, educational level) 
that could influence their risky behaviors. To control for the possible selection effects, I 
add a set of demographic variables, including income, education, employment and region 
in Specification 3 and 4. The estimates in Table 16 suggest that individuals having MSAs 
are more likely to wear a seatbelt while driving and obey traffic signals. This is the 
opposite of moral hazard. For moral hazard observed in the traditional insurance markets, 
individuals have a tendency to take risks knowing that the potential costs or burdens of 
taking such risks will be shared with the insurance companies. However, given that 
individuals are self-insured under the MSAs schemes and are fully responsible for their 
own medical expenditures, they are probably more careful concerning behaviors that are 
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related to health outcomes, such as using a seatbelt while driving and obeying traffic 
signals. 
Conclusion 
The analysis in the third chapter yields three main findings. First, I find that 
individuals with MSAs incur 17 RMB more medical expenses per 1000 RMB unit of 
MSA balance, while I find no significant effect of after-tax income on medical expenses. 
The findings suggest that individuals may discount their assets in the MSAs and tend to 
spend more on medical services when they have their own MSA. The case study of 
Medical Saving Accounts in China provides a perspective on how MSAs affect out-of-
pocket spending on medical care. This result is robust to adding covariates, and 
instrumenting for the MSA balance using the housing account balance. 
Second, I examine three types of risky behaviors for their relationship with medical 
expenditures. I find undertaking risky investments is associated with incresed medical 
expenditures, while always using a seat belt and obeying traffic signals are also 
associated with higher medical expenditures. In addition, the difference-in-difference 
estimation suggests that the existence of MSAs may cause higher medical expenditures in 
the health insurance market. The results suggest that preference heterogeneity also 
influences medical spending in the presence of the Chinese MSA scheme as revealed by 
three types of risky behaviors.  
Finally, the test for moral hazard suggest that individuals may become more risk 
averse with MSAs than without, specifically by increasing their use of seat belts and 
obeying traffic signals. These risk averse individuals with MSAs probably use more 
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preventive and primary health care, which could provide a potential explanation for the 
increase in the medical expenditures in the presence of MSAs.  
Overall, these findings using recent Chinese data suggest that MSAs play an 
important role when consumers make health expenditure decisions. And preferences 
involving risk and prevention also appear to be influenced by the MSAs scheme. The 
results should be of interest to policy makers as they should be cautious about using 
MSAs as an instrument to contain medical expenditures. 
 
Table 12: Summary Statistics of 2011 CHFS Data Sample 
Variable 2011 CHFS 
Average Age 38 
% Male 51 
% Married 77 
Average Self-reported Health Status 2.64 
Medical Expenditures  
% with Medical Saving Accounts 40 
Average Medical Saving Account Balance 1322.11 
Average Monthly Out of Pocket Medical Expenditures 216.68 
Average Monthly After-tax Income 2171.77 
Average Monthly Personal Care Expenditure (Not Covered by Insurance) 119.70 
Behavior  
Fraction of car drivers 30 
Fraction always using seatbelt among car drivers 60 
Fraction always using traffic lights 80 
Fraction choosing to undertake no risk in investment 41 
Fraction choosing to invest in the riskiest projects 7 
N 29324 
Note: The self-reported health status is a categorical variable that takes a value from 1 to 5 to indicate 
the self-reported physical condition compared with peers, where a very good condition is assigned a 
value of 1 and a very poor condition is given a value of 5. The personal care expenditure is the individual 
spending on personal care that is not covered by insurance, e.g. dietary supplements and massage.  
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Table 13: OLS Estimation of Medical Expense on MSAs Balance and After-tax Income 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OOP Medical Expenditure   
MSA Balance .016* .017* .017* .017* .016* .023* 
 (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.010) (.014) 
After-tax Income -.0009 -.0008 -.0008 -.0008 -.0010 -.0024 
 (.0007) (.0007) (.0006) (.0007) (.0015) (.0052) 
Gender 25.942 20.320 20.196 20.070 25.296 25.871 
 (28.375) (27.006) (26.358) (26.611) (31.067) (36.806) 
Age .926 .112 .129 .103 .245 .229 
 (1.011) (1.221) (1.145) (1.150) (2.05) (2.766) 
Marriage Status 5.716 5.360 5.357 5.737 3.089 19.886 
 (18.670) (18.602) (18.608) (18.608) (15.039) (29.198) 
Education -14.995 -15.405 -15.642 -15.639 -25.541 -12.430 
 (9.999) (10.034) (9.572) (9.821) (15.520) (10.821) 
Ethnicity -.254 -.233 -.249 -.207 -.893 -.508 
 (1.256) (1.228) (1.314) (1.372) (1.583) (1.929) 
Self-reported Health Status  43.975* 44.074* 44.401* 40.530** 47.121** 
  (23.122) (23.612) (23.691) (16.893) (22.030) 
Consumption Attitude   -2.523 -2.560 -2.238 -3.118 
   (1.892) (1.912) (2.019) (2.486) 
Personal Care Expenditure    -.002 -.001 -.003 
    (.003) (.004) (.008) 
IV for MSA Balance No No No No Yes Yes 
IV for After-tax Income No No No No No Yes 
Province Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Data source is CHFS 2011. Table reports results from OLS regressions for individuals with MSAs. 
N= 6,294. Dependent variable is the out-of-pocket medical expenditure that consumers really care about 
and need to pay from their savings in MSAs or pocket money (unit: RMB). The self-reported health 
status is a categorical variable that takes a value from 1 to 5 to indicate the self-reported physical 
condition compared with peers, where a very good condition is given a value of 1 and a very poor 
condition is given a value of 5. The consumption attitude is a categorical variable that takes a value from 
1 to 5 to indicate how much the individual is willing to spend more when the value of assets rises, where 
a value of 1 is given to “very willing” and a value of 5 is given to “very unwilling”. The personal care 
expenditure is the individual spending on personal care that is not covered by insurance, e.g. dietary 
supplements and massage. Standard errors shown in parentheses for OLS regressions are robust and 
clustered by province for all specifications. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 14: The Relationship between Risky Behavior and Medical Expense 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OOP Medical Expenditure 
Risky (or Risk Reducing) Behavior Measure A: Always wear seat belt 
Coeff 20.557 20.557 35.536* 35.534** 
 (20.286) (14.264) (21.914) (14.785) 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Province Effect No Yes No Yes 
N 6633 6633 6633 6633 
Risky (or Risk Reducing) Behavior Measure B: Always obey a traffic signal 
Coeff 47.378* 47.378* 48.693* 48.693* 
 (25.297) (23.570) (26.706) (24.606) 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Province Effect No Yes No Yes 
N 10954 10954 10954 10954 
Risky (or Risk Reducing) Behavior Measure C: Invest in high risk projects 
Coeff 47.272 47.272 50.335 50.335* 
 (31.753) (29.138) (30.281) (28.928) 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Province Effect No Yes No Yes 
N 11073 11073 11073 11073 
Note: Data source is CHFS 2011. Table reports results from OLS regressions. Dependent variables is 
the out-of-pocket medical expenditure that consumers really care about and need to pay from their 
savings in MSAs or pocket money (unit: RMB). The first row in each risky behavior panel gives the 
coefficient on that risky behavior variable. The investment in high risk projects is a categorical variable 
that takes a value from 1 to 5 to indicate the increasing of risk and return of the investment that the 
individual choose to take. Additional controls include demographic variables such as self-reported 
health status measures, age, income, education, marriage status, and gender. Standard errors for OLS 
regressions are robust and shown in parentheses for all specifications, and are clustered by province for 
Specifications 2 and 4. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 15: Difference in Difference Estimation between Risky Behavior and Medical 
Expense for MSAs Holders 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OOP Medical Expenditure 
Risky (or Risk Reducing) Behavior Measure A: Always wear seat belt 
Interaction Coeff 42.439 42.439 45.424 45.424* 
 (37.694) (32.457) (33.811) (27.361) 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Province Effect No Yes No Yes 
N 6633 6633 6633 6633 
Risky (or Risk Reducing) Behavior Measure B: Always obey a traffic signal 
Interaction Coeff 10.714 10.714 10.020 10.019 
 (27.387) (25.1304) (28.088) (26.261) 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Province Effect No Yes No Yes 
N 10954 10954 10954 10954 
Risky (or Risk Reducing) Behavior Measure C: Invest in high risk projects 
Interaction Coeff 35.351 35.351 37.815 37.815* 
 (23.705) (21.085) (24.116) (21.491) 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Province Effect No Yes No Yes 
N 11073 11073 11073 11073 
Note: Data source is CHFS 2011. Table reports results from OLS regressions. Dependent variables is 
the out-of-pocket medical expenditure that consumers really care about and need to pay from their 
savings in MSAs or pocket money (unit: RMB). The first row in each risky behavior panel gives the 
coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy variable for holding MSAs and that risky 
behavior variable. The investment in high risk projects is a categorical variable that takes a value from 
1 to 5 to indicate the increasing level of risk and return on investment that the individual would like to 
choose. Additional controls include demographic variables such as self-reported health status measures, 
age, income, education, marriage status, gender and sex. Standard errors for OLS regressions are robust 
and shown in parentheses for all specifications, and are clustered by province for Specifications 2 and 
4. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 16: The Relationship between Risky Behavior and Medical Saving Accounts 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risky Behavior 
Risky (or Risk Reducing) Behavior Measure A: Always wear seat belt 
Coeff .1764*** .1765* .1617** .1617* 
 (.0380) (.0894) (.0641) (.0974) 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Province Effect No Yes No Yes 
N 6633 6633 6633 6633 
Risky (or Risk Reducing) Behavior Measure B: Always obey a traffic signal 
Coeff .1127*** .1127*** .1062*** .1062*** 
 (.0150) (.0317) (.0253) (.0344) 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Province Effect No Yes No Yes 
N 10954 10954 10954 10954 
Note: Data source is CHFS 2011. Table reports results from OLS regressions. Dependent variables are 
the risky behavior variables. The key independent variable is the dummy variable indicating having 
MSAs or not. Additional controls include demographic variables such as self-reported health status 
measures, age, income, education levels, marriage status, and gender. Standard errors for OLS 
regressions are robust and shown in parentheses for all specifications, and are clustered by province for 
specification 2 and 4. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The General Structure of Medical Saving Accounts in China 
 
Contributions                                     Benefits 
Employee        2% of wage   100%      MSA                   Outpatient Care 
(3.8% of wage) 
                           30%                   coinsurance 
                                                    deductible(10% of annual wage)                                  
Social Risk 
Employer        6% of wage   70%      Pool Fund  max 4*wage  Large Medical Expenses 
(4.2% of wage) 
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